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I.
INTRODUCTION

It should be no news by now that the credit rating industry is plagued by conflicts of interest. Credit rating agencies
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. The author thanks Adam Bennett, Hongjun Wang and Jing Zhang for their valuable research assistance. The author is responsible for all mistakes.
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have been rating the debts issued or underwritten by affiliated
entities, or entities that have recently retained those rating
agencies' help in structuring debts for the purpose of enhancing credit ratings. Moreover, for decades the rating agencies
have relied heavily on the fees paid by the entities subject to
their ratings in order to sustain their rating business. The
rated entities have been given an upper hand in the bargain
because they are free to walk away, without paying, from a preliminary rating that does not meet their lofty expectations. 1
The pressure on the rating agencies to assign ratings that
please their clients sows the seeds for conflicts of interest and
for the ensuing problems in a financial market that relies heavily on the accuracy of credit ratings.
Credit rating agencies have been in the spotlight since the
Enron scandal in the early 2000s, when they delivered invest2
ment grade ratings only days before the firm went bankrupt.
They did not become household names, however, until the
subprime mortgage debacle in 2007 that triggered the financial market meltdown from which the global economy is yet to
recover. Rating agencies gave triple-A ratings to 75% of the
$3.2 trillion subprime mortgages that
lost sizable value only
3
months after the ratings were made.
Not surprisingly, regulations on credit rating agencies
tightened. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was
enacted, 4 followed by the rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") in June 2007.5 In the short span of
1. For an in-depth discussion of the conflicts of interest problems in the
credit rating industry, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE ROLE
AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS (2003) [hereinafter SEC Report of 2003], available at http://

www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport003.pdf.
2. See Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Running on Empty: Enron
Faces Collapse as Credit, Stock Dive and Dynegy Bolts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001,
at Al.
3. See David Evans & Caroline Salas, Credit Rating Agencies on Trial Weren't They Supposed to Spot This?, N.Z. HERALD (Jun. 8, 2009), http://www
.nzherald.co.nz/management/news/article.cfm?c_id=59&objectid=105765
.90. See also Elliot Blair Smith, 'Race To Bottom' at Moody's, S&P Secured Subprime's Boom, Bust, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.bloomberg
.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=ax3vfya_ Vtdo.
4. See infra note 8.
5. See Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
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the two years afterwards, the SEC issued more than ten releases to propose and eventually adopt two more sets of rule
changes. 6 At the legislative level, the Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, popularly referred to as financial market overhaul bill or the Dodd-Frank Bill, was signed
into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010. This statute further enhances credit rating agency regulation by introducing
key changes, such as removing the immunity from liabilities
that the industry has long enjoyed for even gross negligence in
7
their ratings.
Though regulatory efforts toward reform are ongoing, the
rating industry's issuer-pay business model is difficult to
change. Under this system, revenues paid by issuers provide
rating agencies with the financial resources to rate a wide
range of debt issues. But the scope of coverage is destined to
55857, 72 Fed. Reg. 33,563 (Jun. 12, 2007) [hereinafter June 2007 Adopting
Release].
6. See Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. 40 (proposed Jul. 1, 2008) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 239-40); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,124 (proposedJul. 1, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275); References to
Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed.
Reg. 40,088 (proposed Jul. 1, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
242); Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 6456 (Feb. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts.
240, 249(b)) [hereinafter Feb. 2009 Adopting Release]; Re-proposed Rules
for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg.
6485 (proposed Feb 2, 2009) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 240, 243); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
74 Fed. Reg. 52,358 (Oct. 5, 2009) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 240, 242,
249, 270); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (proposed Oct. 5, 2009) (to be codified
at C.F.R. pts. 229-30, 239-40, 242, 249, 270, 275); Credit Ratings Disclosure,
74 Fed. Reg. 53086 (proposed Oct. 7, 2009) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts.
229, 239-40, 249, 274); Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule
4 36
(g) under the Securities Act of 1933, 74 Fed. Reg. 53114 (proposed Oct.
7, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 220); Amendments to Rules for
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832
(Nov. 23, 2009) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 240, 243) [hereinafter Nov.
2009 Adopting Release]; Proposed Rules For Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 63866 (proposed Dec 4, 2009) (to be
codified at C.F.R. pts. 240, 249(b).
7. For a summary of key provisions on credit rating agencies in this legislation, see Wall Street Reform: Credit Rating Agencies, AM. FOR FIN. REFORM,
June 30, 2010, http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2010/06/what-happened-onwall-street-reform-credit-rating-agencies/#.
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dwindle if rating agencies must rely on alternative (and reduced) revenue sources such as rating subscriptions and debt
consulting services. Other informational values of credit rat8
ings will also be lost.

In May 2010, Senator Al Franken from Minnesota proposed the establishment of a rating board to dispatch rating
assignments to agencies of its choice based on the agencies'
performance record (the "Franken Proposal"). The proposal
was eliminated from the final version of the financial market
overhaul bill due to concern that the effects of such a fundamental change had not been closely studied. 9 However, Congress has mandated that the SEC further study the conflicts of
interest issue before reconsidering the Franken Proposal in
two years. 10 Credit rating agency regulation remains at the top
of the SEC's agenda.
This paper examines the effectiveness of an important
part of the credit rating agency regulation: the performance
disclosure requirements that were introduced by the SEC in
200711 and strengthened in 2009.12 Under these regulations,
credit rating agencies are required to disclose their historical
8. For a discussion on how credit ratings help institutional investors select financial assets, see Approaches To Improving Credit Rating Agency Regulation: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on CapitalMkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 2-3 (2009) (testimony of
Gregory W. Smith, Colo. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n), available at http://
www.house.gov/apps/list/heaing/financialsvcs-dem/gregoryw_smithtestimony.pdf.
9. An excerpt of Senator Dodd's speech on the floor of the Senate on
May 13, 2010 states: "My colleague from Minnesota has what I think is a very
sound and good idea. Here are my concerns ....
I don't know what the
implications are. Not all the rating agencies are equal. I think there ought to
be more of them. I think there a lot of smaller one [sic] out there that out
[sic] to grow in their competency and do things differently. But there are
different companies of different sizes and needs, and to be choosing rating
agencies based on arbitrary choice without considering whether or not the
rating agency can actually do the job is my concern." Michael Corkery,
Credit Rating Smackdown: Franken v. Dodd, WSJ BLOcS DEALJ. (May 14, 2010,
11:09 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2O10/05/ 14/credit-raters-takeheart-chris-dodd-to-the-rescue/.
10. See David M. Herszenhorn, House-Senate Talks Drop New Credit-Rating
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/
business/i 6regulate.html.
11. See June 2007 Adopting Release, supra note 5.
12. See Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6; Nov. 2009 Adopting
Release, supra note 6.
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rating transitions and default rates when they register with the
SEC as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization
("NRSRO") and to update those disclosures on an annual basis. Credit rating agencies are also required to publish on their
websites a random sample of ten percent of issuer-paid ratings
and their complete history for each rating category, as well as
to disclose all ratings (issuer-paid or unsolicited) that have occurred since June 26, 2007.
The purposes of these disclosure requirements are twofold. First, they enhance the reputational cost to rating agencies that engage in inappropriate rating actions. Second, they
help break the entry barrier for smaller rating agencies with
strong performance records in a market that is dominated by
certain established names, namely Moody's Investors Service,
Inc. ("Moody's"), Standard & Poor's Rating Services ("Stan3
dard & Poor's"), and to some extent, Fitch, Inc. ("Fitch").1
Credit rating agencies claim that their reputation is their
biggest asset, and that it would not serve the agencies' best
interest to risk losing that asset by giving in to the pressure of a
small number of clients.14 Indeed, there is some evidence that
the concern for reputational damage does deter inappropriate
rating actions. 15 Thus, it is plausible for the current regulation
to enlist the help of reputational sanctions through performance disclosures in policing credit rating agencies' behaviors.
But are the disclosures in their current forms capable of accomplishing their mission? In other words, will debt issuers
and the investment community use the information embedded in these disclosures in selecting agencies for their debt
ratings? If the answer is no, then performance disclosures, no
matter how elaborate, will not sanction or enhance credit rating agencies' reputations, and they will not be as effective as
the SEC has hoped for as a tool to combat conflicts of interest.
Instead, disclosures would simply drain the financial resources
13. See infra notes 55, 64, and 70.
14. See THE TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, REPORT OF THE AcrVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, (Sept. 2003), http://

www.fsa.gojp/inter/ios/20030930/05.pdf.
15. See Daniel M. Covitz &Paul Harrison,

TESTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

AT BOND RATING AGENCIES WITH MARKET ANTICIPATION:

Evidence that Reputa-

tion Incentives Dominate, Fed. Res. (Dec. 2003), http://www.federaireserve.

gov/pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf.
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of the1 6 credit rating industry due to their implementation
costS.

The answer to this question is not at all apparent. The
current regulation does not require uniformity in the data, so
there will be differences in rating category designations and
even rating symbols among rating agencies. For example,
debts issued by regional government agencies might be classified as government securities by one agency but as corporate
debt by another. One rating agency may use the symbol "D" to
indicate the occurrence of default while another may use a different symbol for the same purpose. The eXtensible Business
Reporting Language ("XBRL") format in which the rating actions data are reported has made data downloading easier, but
in order to compare the performance statistics one must sort
out the numerous inconsistencies between different agencies'
data. Given the large volumes of data on historical rating actions - for instance, there are 463,061 Excel rows and 17 variables in Moody's ten-percent rating sample alone - and the
amount of manual processing required to collate data into
consistent forms, comparing performance measurements of
multiple credit rating agencies is a tedious and laborious process. 17 Will debt issuers indeed judiciously analyze the data in
order to identify a top performing agency for its next rating
assignment, or will they simply choose a firm that is generally
well-regarded in the industry because such a choice is easiest
to justify and involves the least amount of effort?
Despite their importance, the effects of rating agencies'
performance disclosures have never been studied. This paper
intends to fill this void by examining the relationship between
key performance metrics and the volume of rating assignments received by rating agencies during the period of 20002009. Although performance disclosures were only recently
added to credit rating agency regulations, data items subject to
these reporting requirements have been collected (and sold
for profit) by data vendors, such as Bloomberg, since the
1990s. Almost every financial institution subscribes to Bloom16. For the SEC's discussion on anticipated costs for implementing the
disclosure requirements, see Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 6364; Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 101-02.
17. For a detailed discussion on the inconsistencies in the performance
disclosure, see infra II.B.3.
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berg, and these institutions function as advisors to corporations and sovereigns that issue debts.1 8 Moreover, the Bloomberg data are readily downloadable into Excel so that they can
be sorted and analyzed according to the needs of their users. 19
In other words, information that is available to debt issuers
now pursuant to SEC performance disclosure requirements
has long been accessible by them at least indirectly through
their financial advisors. This long-standing accessibility makes
it possible for this study to examine the past relationship between disclosures and market shares in the credit rating industry and to assess how effectively the new disclosure regulations
function as reputational sanctions on credit rating agencies'
inappropriate behavior.
The importance of this study extends beyond the borders
of the credit rating industry. The SEC is in the process of implementing a new regulation that requires all companies
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act") to provide their financial statements to the SEC and to
post them on the company website, both in an interactive data
format using XBRL. 20 An important goal of this new regulation is to allow the investing public to compare financial and
business performances across companies, reporting periods,
and industries. 21 Similar regulatory initiatives are also present
in financial institution and mutual fund reporting. 22 Will the
disclosures result in higher scrutiny of the reporting companies' performance measurements? Will they help the investing
public make investment choices based on the merits of the reporting companies? The results of this paper can be a valuable
18. For a detailed discussion of the Bloomberg data and the company's
service to financial institutions, see its internet webpage http://www.bloomberg.com/about/. See also Joshua Kennon, What Is a Bloomberg Terminal or
Bloomberg Machine? The Tool of Choice for Serious Professional Investors, http://
beginnersinvest.about.com/od/research/qt/bloomberg.htm.
19. Such information can be retrieved by using the "RATI" and "RATC"
functions inside a Bloomberg terminal.
20. See SEC Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting, 17 C.F.R.
§§229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9002.pdf.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 17. See also Interactive Data for Mutual Fund Risk/Return Summary, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-28617, 2009 SEC LEXIS 587
(Feb. 11, 2009).
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reference point for the SEC in answering these important
questions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Part II discusses
the framework of the credit rating agency regulation and the
new performance reporting requirements, highlights the inconsistency problem in disclosures materials, and assesses the
effects of the disclosures in light of findings in cognitive science and consumer choice research. Part III discusses the
data, empirical methodology, and results of this study. Part IV
discusses the regulatory implications from the results of this
study and makes recommendations on how the current regulation on credit rating agencies' performance disclosures should
be improved. Part V concludes this paper.
II.
THE PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES

A. An Overview of Credit Rating Agency Regulations
In the United States, credit rating agencies were largely
unregulated until the enactment of the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006.23 This statute created a new section - Section 15E under the Exchange Act - that established a regulatory framework for a registration and recognition process to
which rating agencies must adhere in order to hold the NRSRO status. This statute provides guidelines under which the
SEC is mandated to adopt and implement detailed rules on
24
NRSRO recognition conditions and registration procedures.
Pursuant to the authority granted by the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006, the SEC adopted detailed rules on
NRSRO recognition conditions and registration procedures in
23. Prior to the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, the term "NRSRO"

was initially adopted in 1975 solely for determining capital charges on different grades of debt securities under the Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1.
24. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act requires an NRSRO to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures to address conflicts of interest; to provide required information, including any conflict of
interest relating to the issuance of credit rating by the rating agency, to the
SEC upon filing the registration statement by the rating agency for its NRSRO recognition; and to update information contained in the initial registration statement on an annual basis. The statute also grants the SEC the
authority to revoke the registration of any NRSRO that fails to maintain "adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently produce credit ratings with integrity." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E.
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June 2007.25 In 2009, the SEC adopted a series of regulatory
changes to further enhance the transparency of rating methodologies and performances and to strengthen NRSROs' recordkeeping and reporting obligations, in order to assist 26the
SEC in monitoring NRSROs' compliance with regulation.
The SEC rules have targeted conflicts of interest at both
the rating analyst level and the rating agency level. The conflicts at the analyst level arise mainly from analysts' owning the
securities subject to their rating, holding directorship or employment positions at the rated entities, maintaining special
personal or business relationship with the rated entities (for
example, having an immediate family member who works at a
rated entity), receiving gifts from the rated entities, and being
compensated based on the rating fees that they help generate
for the rating agencies that employ them. 27 The conflicts at
the agency level arise mainly from rating agencies' receiving
compensation for their ratings from the rated entities, providing consulting and other ancillary services to the rated entities,
rating securities issued or underwritten by affiliated entities,
and receiving subscription fees from financial institutions
whose asset portfolios include securities subject to the rating
2
agencies' ratings.

8

Key regulations targeting conflicts at the analyst level include: (1) Prohibiting a credit rating agency from issuing a
credit rating where either the agency or its employees directly
involved in the rating process owns the securities of the rated
entity. 29 (2) Prohibiting a credit rating agency from issuing

credit ratings with regard to an entity if a person directly involved in the rating process is an officer or director of the
rated entity. 30 (3) Requiring credit rating agencies to establish
internal rules to address conflicts of interest arising from their
employees' special personal or business relationship with a
25. SeeJune 2007 Adopting Release, supra note 5.
26. See Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6; Oct. 2009 Adopting
Release, supra note 6; Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6.
27. For a detailed discussion of the sources of conflicts of interest at both
the rating analyst level and the rating agency level, see Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflict of Interest in the Credit Rating Industy, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 253, 260 (2010).

28. Id.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c) (2) (2009).
30. § 240.17g-5(c) (4 ).
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rated entity, although there is no outright prohibition in the
SEC Rules against a credit rating agency issuing credit ratings
when such conflicts exist. 31 (4) Prohibiting a credit rating
agency from issuing credit ratings if a person directly involved
in the rating process has received gifts from the rated entity
that have an aggregate value of more than $25.32
Major provisions targeting conflicts of interest at the rating agency level include: (1) Prohibiting credit rating agencies
from issuing credit ratings on securities issued or underwritten
by an affiliated entity (i.e., a company directly or indirectly
controlling, controlled by, or under the common control with,
the rating agency). 3 (2) Prohibiting a credit rating agency
from issuing credit ratings with regard to an entity for which
the agency made recommendations about the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities, or activities of the entity.34 (3)
Prohibiting a credit rating agency from threatening to issue
unfavorable ratings on the condition that the issuer subject to
such ratings purchase ancillary services from the rating
agency. 35 (4) Prohibiting a credit rating agency from issuing a
credit rating where the person soliciting the credit rating was
the source of ten percent or more of the total net revenue of
the credit rating agency during the most recently ended fiscal
year. 3 6 (5) Prohibiting a person directly involved in the credit
rating process from participating in the negotiation or discus37
sion of fees paid for the provision of the credit rating.
In addition to the above provisions that directly address
concern
of conflicts of interest, the Credit Rating Agency
the
31. § 240.17g-5(b) (7).
32. § 240.17g-5(c)( 7 ).
33. § 240.17g-5(c) (3).
34. § 240.17g-5(c) (5).
35. Exchange Act Rule 17g-6(a) (2) prohibits an NRSRO from issuing, or
offering or threatening to issue, a credit rating that is not determined in
accordance with the NRSRO's established procedures for determining credit
ratings, but is based on whether the rated person purchases or will purchase
the credit rating or another product or service. Exchange Act Rule l 7 g6(a) (3) prohibits an NRSRO from modifying, or offering or threatening to
modify, a credit rating in a manner contrary to its procedures for modifying
a credit rating based on whether the rated person, or an affiliate of the rated
person, purchases or will purchase the credit rating or any other service or
product of the NRSRO and its affiliates. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-6(a) (2009).
36. § 240.17g-5(c) (1).
37. § 240.17g-5(c) (6).
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Reform Act and SEC rules also include extensive record-keeping requirements intended to help the SEC staff identify possible inappropriate rating actions. The records must be kept for
at least three years after they are made or received. 38 Key record-keeping requirements are: (1) A credit rating agency
must disclose in its initial and updated Form NRSRO twenty
largest clients (i.e., issuers, underwriters and subscribers) in
terms of their net revenue contributions to the credit rating
agency in the preceding fiscal year.3 9 (2) A credit rating
agency must retain records of the original entries of information that feeds into its financial reports, 40 and an account record for each fee-paying client. 4 1 (3) A credit rating agency
must retain any internal records used to form the basis of a
credit rating, including nonpublic information and work papers such as the raw results of a quantitative credit rating
model and notes of conversations with the management of an
issuer that was the subject of the credit rating.42 (4) A credit
rating agency must retain a record of any external and internal
communications (including emails received and sent by the
credit rating agency and its employees that relate to credit ratings) ' 43 and any document relating to the credit rating
agency's internal audit plans, reports, follow-up measures, and
all records identified by the internal auditors as necessary to
perform the internal audits. 44 (5) A credit rating agency must
retain a record of any written complaints from a person not
associated with the credit rating agency about the performance of a credit analyst in regard to a credit rating. 45 (6) A
credit rating agency must retain a record of the identity of any
personnel that participated in the determination or approval
of the credit rating, the dates of rating actions, with a notation
of whether a rating is solicited or unsolicited by an outside
46
entity.
38.
39.
40.
41.

§ 240.17g-2(c).
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a) (1) (B) (viii).
17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2(a)(1) (2009).

§ 240.17g-2(a) (3).
42. § 240.17g-2(b) (2).

43. § 240.17g-2(b) (7).
44. § 240.17g-2(b) (5).
45. § 240.17g-2(b) (8).
46. § 240.17g-2(a) (2).
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There are additional record keeping provisions for structured finance ratings. Under those provisions, a credit rating
agency is required to document reasons when a final credit
rating materially deviates from the rating implied by a quantitative model if the model is a substantial component of the
rating process. 47 Moreover, a credit rating agency that rates a
structured finance product must provide on its website information pertinent to its rating to other rating agencies who
have not been hired to rate the product. This disclosure requirement intends to promote unsolicited ratings by multiple
rating agencies and thus increase the likelihood of detecting
inappropriate rating inflations by the rating agency that is
48
hired by the issuer to provide the rating.
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act and the SEC rules
also contain important provisions that promote transparency
in the credit rating process. Under these regulations, an application for registration as an NRSRO must contain information
regarding the procedures and methodologies used by the
credit rating agency to determine credit ratings. 49 Moreover,
such disclosures must be sufficiently detailed to provide users
of credit ratings with an understanding of the process the ap50
plicant or the NRSRO uses in determining credit ratings.
Finally, the SEC rules require credit rating agencies to
make available to the public their historical rating actions and
performance statistics so that investors can form an independent opinion of the rating quality of particular agencies and
make industry-wide comparisons of rating agencies' performance. The next section discusses those performance disclosures in detail.
47. § 240.17g-2(a) (2). Credit rating agencies expressed concern over the
possibility that the rule could lead to the overemphasis of quantitative models at the expense of applying qualitative factors. Partly due to these comments, the SEC has narrowed the application of the rule to ratings of structured finance products. See Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at
6471.
48. See Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 26, at 63,844.
49. See Exchange Act §15E(a)(1)(B)(ii) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)).
50. See [Application for Registration as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (Form NRSRO)], http://www.sec.gov/ about/forms/
formnrsro.pdf (last updated Apr. 2009).
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B.

The PerformanceDisclosure Requirements

There are three main components to the regulations on
performance disclosures of credit rating agencies: the disclosure of rating transition and default rates, the disclosure of
ten-percent of issuer-paid ratings for all rating sectors in the
entire history of a credit rating agency's operation (hereinafter, "Ten-Percent Rating Sample"), and the disclosure of all
ratings (whether issuer-paid or unsolicited) for all rating sectors since June 26, 2007 (hereinafter, "Complete Record Since
June 2007"). This section discusses each of these components
in detail.
1.

Rating Transitions and Default Rates

Credit rating agencies which apply for the NRSRO status
must disclose in Exhibit 1 of Form NRSRO performance measurement statistics over one, three, and ten-year periods up to
the most recent calendar year-end. 51 The disclosure must reveal historical ratings transition and default rates within each
rating category, notch, or grade used by the NRSRO. 52 The
default statistics must include defaults relative to the initial rating.53 Instructions to Exhibit 1 of Form NRSRO also require
NRSROs to describe how they derive their statistics in sufficient detail so that viewers can understand the measures. The
instructions do not identify any other particular performance
statistics that must be disclosed. Moreover, the SEC rules have
regard to
not imposed any standardization requirements with
54
the performance statistics disclosed in Exhibit 1.
The performance disclosures are intended to allow users
to compare the quality of different credit rating agencies and
to enhance competition by making it easier for smaller agencies to develop proven track records so they can break through
the entry barriers in an industry that is dominated by brand
55
names.
Credit rating agencies typically disclose rating transitions
through matrices that show migrations of ratings from one
grade to another within a specified period of time. To illus51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
June 2007 Adopting Release, supra note 5 at 46.
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trate how a transition matrix highlights a credit rating agency's
performance, Table 1 reproduces a Moody's transition matrix
for corporate issuers included in its 2010 annual certification
56
document.
TABLE 1

SAMPLE TRANSITION MATRIX

CORPORATE ISSUERS

FROM/TO:
Aaa
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B
Caa-C

Aaa

Aa

A

Baa

Ba

B

CaaC

WR

86.42%

7.79%

1.00%

0.03%

0.09%

0.01%

0.01%

4.67%

0.84%
0,04%
0.01%
0.01%
0.01%
0,00%

84.86%
1.53%
0.05%
0.05%
0.03%
0.02%

8.73%
86.93%
3.69%
0.30%
0.11%
0.02%

0.52%
6.20%
84.92%
5.26%
0.32%
0.12%

0.06%
0.55%
4.25%
74.14%
4.37%
0.41%

0.04%
0.11%
0.89%
8.16%
73.73%
7.37%

0.00%
0.04%
0.22%
0.62%
6.55%
62.89%

4.94%
4.59%
5.96%
11.45%
14.87%
29.16%

Source: Moody's Investor Service Credit Ratings Performance Measurement Statistics,
March 2010

This matrix shows rating changes that took place during
2009. According to numbers on the first line below the caption, 86.42% of corporate issuers that were rated "Aaa" at the
beginning of 2009 retained that rating during 2009, but 7.79%
of them were downgraded to "Aa," 1% to "A," and 0.03% to
"Baa," and so on. The symbol "CaaC" includes three different
rating grades: "Caa," "Ca," and "C." According to Moody's definitions, companies rated "Caa" are judged to be of poor standing and subject to very high credit risk. Companies rated "Ca"
are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default,
with some prospects of principal and interest recovery. Companies rated "C" are typically in default, with little prospect for
recovery of principal or interest. 57 The transition matrix shows
that 0.01% of companies rated "Aaa" at the beginning of 2009
migrated to the lowest tier of "Caa-C." Moody's uses "WR" to
stand for "withdrawal of rating." Withdrawal typically occurs
when Moody's feels that it lacks adequate information to assess
58
the issuer's credit risk.
56. Moody's Investors Service, available at http://v3.moodys.com/Publish
inglmages/MCO/FormNRSRO_2009_Public-sent.pdf.
57. See Moody's Investor Service, Moody's Rating Symbols & Definitions,
Updated Reference Guide (Moody's Investor Service, New York, N.Y.), June
2009, at 8, available at http://v3.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodys
RatingsAttachments/MoodysRatingsSymbolsand%20Definitions.pdf.

58. Id. at 50.
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The transition matrix reveals important information
about Moody's rating performance. First, it shows the default
ratio by each rating category. A high default ratio, particularly
a high default ratio for issuers that had a rating of "Baa" or
above (i.e., investment grades), suggests that the original rating was likely inadequate, since an investment grade should be
assigned only to issuers which the rating agency believes are of
moderate to minimum credit risk.59 Second, the transition matrix shows the ratio of "fallen angels," which refers to issuers
that have been downgraded from an investment grade to a
non-investment grade. An abnormally high percentage of
"fallen angels" raises a red flag about the appropriateness of
the original investment grade rating. 60 Third, the transition
matrix shows the frequency of rating changes, which is the
number of issuers that experienced rating changes during a
given time period. While rating agencies should maintain
timely updates on their ratings based on new developments in
the rated entities' credit risk, unstable ratings, evidenced by an
abnormally high rating change ratio, undermine the predictive power of the original ratings.
2.

The "Ten-Percent Rating Sample" and "Complete Record Since
June 2007"

In the February 2009 Adopting Release, 6 1 the SEC
adopted paragraph (d) of Rule 1 7 g-2 to require each credit
rating agency registered as an NRSRO to make publicly available on its website rating action histories for ten percent of outstanding issuer-paid credit ratings for each rating class for
which the agency has issued 500 or more issuer-paid credit ratings. 62 The "Ten-Percent Rating Sample" must be selected randomly and disclosed to the public no later than six months
after an included rating action is taken. Credit rating agencies
must indicate on Form NRSRO the web address where the
data file can be accessed. Moreover, the rating history data
must be maintained in XBRL format so users can search dy59. MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, supra note 57.
60. See STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 537 (McGraw-Hill,
5th ed. 1999).
61. Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 5.
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2(d) (2009).
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namically and analyze the data. 63 The purpose of the "TenPercent Rating Sample" is to allow financial market participants to perform statistical analyses of NRSRO performance
with respect to issuer-paid credit ratings. 64 The compliance
date for the new disclosure requirement was April 10, 2009.65
In the Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, 66 the rating action
disclosure was further expanded by a new provision which requires the inclusion of historical ratings information for all
NRSRO credit ratings initially determined on or after June 26,
2007 (the effective date of the Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act), whether a rating is issuer-paid, subscriber-paid, or unsolicited. 67 For ratings that are issuer-paid, the disclosure must
be made no more than twelve months after a rating action is
taken. For ratings that are not issuer-paid, the disclosure must
be made no more than twenty-four months after the rating action is taken. 68 The delay in disclosure is to accommodate the
"concerns raised by NRSROs regarding their ability to derive
revenue from granting market participants access 69to their
credit ratings and downloads of their credit ratings."
The purposes of the rating action disclosures are twofold:
(1) to facilitate ratings-by-ratings comparisons across credit rating agencies, and (2) to generate data that can be used to develop independent statistical analyses of the overall performance of a credit rating agency in total and for each class and
subclass of credit ratings. The ability of the investing public to
compare performances of credit rating agencies will foster accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rat70
ing industry.
As of August 1, 2010, every credit rating agency that has
registered as an NRSRO is in full compliance with the above
disclosure requirements. While the disclosures vary in content
and format, they all contain information on the identity of the
issuer, the date of the rating action, the broad rating sector
(i.e. whether the rating belongs to the corporate, sovereign, or
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

SeeJune 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 27.
See Feb. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 8.
See id. at 1.
Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 63, 833-34.
17 C.F.R. §240.17g-2(a) (2) (iv), (d)(3) (2010).
Id.
See Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 63, 835.
See id. at 63, 836-37.
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asset-backed securities category), the type of rating action (i.e.,
whether the rating action is an upgrade, downgrade, confirmation of the prior rating, new rating, or withdrawal of ratings,
etc.), and the current rating. Some, but not all, rating agencies
provide information on the debt instrument subject to rating
(i.e., maturity date, coupon rates, etc).71
3.

The Problem of Inconsistency

In order to compare performance across different rating
entities, there must be a high level of consistency in the data in
terms of key elements, such as rating symbols and their definitions, as well as rating sector categorizations, and issuer industry specifications. However, the current regulation has not imposed any requirement of consistency that must be observed
by all reporting NRSROs. As a result, the reported data are
substantially inconsistent, which makes the industry-wide comparison of credit rating agencies' performance measurements
a difficult and tedious task.
First, inconsistency exists even in the broad rating sector
categorizations. For example, Standard & Poor's Ten-Percent
Rating Sample7 2 divides ratings into five sectors: "Corporate
Issuers," "Financial Institutions," "Insurance Companies," "Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities," and "Issuers of Government
Securities." "Financial Institutions" include banks, investment
banks and other financial service companies, while "Corporate
Issuers" include industrial corporations. However, Rating & Investment Information, Inc. ("R&I") divides the reported data
into "Corporate Issuers," "Issuers of Government Securities,"
"Municipal Securities," and "Foreign Government Securities."
Financial institutions are included in the "Corporate Issuers"
group. 73 Similarly, A.M. Best Company ("A.M. Best") divides
data into "Insurance Companies" and "Corporate Issuers," but
the issuers included in its "Corporate Issuers" group are mostly
insurance companies, which would have been included in the
71. See, e.g., Moody's Corp. Sample Ratings Data, The 10% Rule, http://
v3.moodys.com/Pages/regOO1004.aspx (click to download the CSV format
file; registration is required) (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
72. Standard & Poor's Rating History Information, http://www.standard
(last visited Oct. 5,
andpoors.com/prot/ratings/history-samples/en/us/
2010).
73. See Rating and Investment Information 2008, Inc., NRSRO, http://
www.r-i.co.jp/eng/regulatory-affair/nrsro.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
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"Insurance Companies" group by other agencies.7 4 An example in this regard is Unum Group, Inc., which is a Fortune 500
company and a market leader in disability, long-term care, and
life insurance sectors. This company is included in the "Corporate Issuers" group in A.M. Best's Ten-Percent Rating Sample,
but the same company is included in Standard & Poor's sam75
ple for "Insurance Companies."

Second, most rating agencies do not provide information
on a debt issuer's industry sector. Even for those agencies that
provide such information, the industry designations are inconsistent. For example,Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. ('ICR")
lists telecommunication companies such as Japan Telecom
Co., LTD under "Information & Communication," while Standard & Poor's uses "Telecommunications" to describe the
same field. Similarly, JCR uses "Electric Power & Gas" to describe the industry group for companies like Chubu Gas Company,7 6 while Standard & Poor's uses the term "Regulated
T&D" for companies in the same field (e.g. Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co.). Examples like these are plentiful. A person interested in calculating and comparing credit rating agencies' performance for any particular industry must first obtain industry
group information from other sources and manually input the
information into the data set, or to the extent such information is already provided in the data, sort out the inconsistencies in industry specifications among millions of rows of data
entries before he can proceed with any statistical analysis.
Third, credit rating agencies have not disclosed the geographical locations of their rated issuers. A person interested
in comparing credit rating agencies' performance for any particular geographical region (US, Europe, Canada, Japan, etc).
must first ascertain the issuer's country of origin from other
74. A.M. Best, (Form NRSRO) Exhibit 1,available at http://www.ambest
.com/nrsro/formnrso.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
75. Compare A.M. Best, Corporate Issuers, http://www3.ambest.com/

ambv/nrsro/contract.aspx?fn=Rulel 7g_2dCorporateIssuersRatingsV2.
XML (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) (listing Unum Group), with Standard &
Poor's Rating History Information, supra note 72 (listing Unum under "In-

surance Companies").
76. Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd.,JCR Ratings History Sample, http:/
/www.jcr.co.jp/english/ratingactions/index.html?PHPSESSID=c971 babefc4
13667a90424725d2a1537 (click to download the ZIP file) (last visited Oct. 5,

2010).
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sources and manually input the information into the data set.
This lack of information about the issuer's geographical location greatly magnifies the difficulty in any geographic comparison.
Fourth, inconsistencies exist in credit rating symbols both
across different agencies and within a single agency. For example, Moody's uses "C" and "Ca" to indicate that the issuer is
"typically" or "likely" in default on its long-term corporate
debts, 77 and switches to the symbol "D" to indicate the occurrence of default for Corporate Family Rating. 78 In contrast,
other agencies typically use "D" to stand for the actual occurrence of default. 79 There is also ambiguity in the definitions
of rating symbols. For example, a company receiving a "C" or
"Ca" from Moody's is said to be "typically" or "likely" in default
but has it indeed defaulted, or is it merely highly likely to
default? The uncertain default status makes it difficult to calculate performance measurements such as the default ratio for
Moody's - a person must manually search the rating announcements and the news on the rated issuer surrounding
the rating announcement dates in order to obtain the exact
default status of the issuer.
In sum, comparing performances of credit rating agencies
appears to be an arduous and time-consuming process in light
of the inconsistencies in the reported data. Will the intended
audience of these disclosures (namely debt issuers and investors) judiciously sift out those inconsistencies from literally
millions of rows of data entries in order to identify a top performer for their next rating assignment, or, perhaps inhibited
by the anticipated difficulty in this task, will they simply make

77. Moody's Rating Symbols & Definitions, 8 (June 2009), http://
v3.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/Moodys
RatingsSymbolsand%20Definitions.pdf.
78. "Moody's Corporate Family Ratings are opinions of a corporate family's ability to honor all of its financial obligations and is assigned to a corporate family as if it had a single class of debt and a single consolidated legal
entity structure." Moody's Rating Symbols & Definitions, Moody's Investors Ser-

vice, 18 (June 2009), http://v3.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodys
RatingsAttachments/MoodysRatingsSymbolsand%20Definitions.pdf.
79. See, e.g., Understanding Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions, STANDARD & POOR'S, 10, 12 (June 3, 2009), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/
spf/pdf/fixedincome/UnderstandingRating.Definitions.pdf.
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an easy pick from among those agencies with an established
name recognition in the relevant sectors?
C.

Effectiveness of Credit Rating Agencies' Disclosures - a
Cognitive Science and Consumer Choice Perspective

Cognitive science postulates that people are information
processors through their perceptual system, motor system, and
cognitive system.8 0 The cognitive system is often discussed in
terms of two types of memories: working memory and longterm memory. Working memory contains the information
under current consideration, while long-term memory stores a
person's knowledge accumulated over years. 81 Working memory is also called the "short-term memory" because items of
information in working memory can be lost in twenty to thirty
seconds if not actively rehearsed.8 2 Moreover, working memory is limited in capacity in that only a few items (four to five,
according to some research) of information can be considered
at any one time.8 3 This limited capacity may cause information
84
overload.
Long-term memory's capacity is generally thought of as
infinite in the sense that, for all practical purposes, there are
no limits to the amount of information that can be stored
there (and subsequently retrieved in the form of "memory").85
However, not all information that is placed in working memory is transferred to or stored in long-term memory. In part
this is due to the amount of time - an estimate of seven
seconds - that it takes to transfer an item of information to
long-term memory. 8 6 The inability of a person to transfer information from working memory to long-term memory in
80. "The perceptual system consists of sensors (receptors), such as the
eyes and ears and associated buffer memories. It translates sensations from
the physical world (i.e., visual or aural input) into symbolic code that can be
processed more fully by the cognitive system. The motor system, on the
other hand, translates thought into action by activating patterns of voluntary
muscles."James R. Bettman,John W. Payne & Richard Staelin, Cognitive Considerations in Designing Effective Labels for PresentingRisk Information, 5 J. PUB.
POL'V & MARKETING 1, 87 (1986).

81. Id.
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id.
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former all the
tasks performed in a short time span makes 8the
v
more important in information processing.
The limited capacity in working memory translates direcdy to people's limited capacity for processing complex information in a short time span. This conclusion is contrary to
the typical assumptions that human beings are extensive information processors and that providing more information is always helpful. 88 Indeed, merely making information available
without providing a practical way through which information
may be readily comprehended and used is not sufficient. "In
general, information must be both available and easily
processable to be utilized." 8
One important implication of the limited working memory capacity is that people use heuristics (or cues) to process
complex information, especially when they are subject to time
pressure. 90 Heuristics are procedures for systematically simplifying the search through the available information about a
problem. Heuristics function by disregarding some of the
available information. 9 1 Multiple heuristics may be available to
facilitate choice-making. In such situations, the extent to
which a particular heuristic is utilized depends on its perceived
reliability (or diagnostic power) in discriminating the quality
of choice alternatives relative to other heuristics.9 2 Heuristics
can be divided into two types based on how easy their valence
can be changed: high scope and low scope. High-scope heuristics evolve over time and thus cannot be changed instantaneously (for example, brand name and reputation), whereas lowscope heuristics are transient and changeable in a short time
(for example, price). Given that high-scope heuristics are established over time and cannot be changed easily, they are
87. Id.
88. Id. at 12-14.
89. Id.
90. See Niraj Dawar & Philip Parker, Marketing Universals: Consumers' Use of
Brand Name, Price, PhysicalAppearance, and RetailerReputation as Signals ofProduct Quality, J. MARKETING, Apr. 1994, at 81, 83. See also Akshay R. Rao & Kent
B. Monroe, The Effect of Price,Brand Name, and Store Name on Buyers' Perceptions
of Product Quality: An Integrative Review, 26J. MARKETING RES. 351, 352 (1989).
91. Bettman, Payne & Staelin, supra note 80, at 109.
92. See Devavrat Purohit &Joydeep Srivastava, Effect of ManufacturerReputation, Retailer Reputation, and Product Warranty on ConsumerJudgments of Product Quality: A Cue Diagnosticity Framework, 10 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 123-34
(2001).
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perceived to have more diagnostic power for the quality of
choice alternatives than low-scope heuristics. Indeed, prior research suggests that a product's brand-name (or its producer's
reputation) is among the most important heuristics used by
93
consumers in assessing a product's quality.

According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model, 94 persuasion can occur through two routes: central or peripheral. The
"central route" is a thoughtful route in which the audience examines all of the information presented in an attempt to evaluate a proposal.9 5 The audience's thinking level or "elaboration" is high. The "peripheral route" is a less thoughtful route
in which the audience does not engage in extensive cognitive
processing of information and its attitudes are informed primarily by the use of simple cues or heuristics. The audience's
"elaboration" level is low.9 6
The audience's "elaboration" level is determined by its
motivation and ability to process the information presented.
When either motivation or ability is absent, persuasion can
only be achieved through the peripheral route by some simple
heuristics or cues because "under low elaboration the audience does not scrutinize the message-relevant information for
its substantive merits. ' 97 Thus, "any evaluation that is formed is
likely to result from simple associations or inference processes
that do not require much cognitive effort."98 When such simple cues are not readily available, even a strong and compelling message may fail to influence the audience's attitude and

behavior. 99
93. Id. at 125. See also William B. Dodd, Kent B. Monroe & Dhruv Grewal,
Effect of Price, Brand, and Store Information on Buyers' Product Evaluations,28 J.
MARKETING RES. 307 (1991).
94. The model was developed by Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo
as an organizing framework for understanding attitude change and persuasion. See RicHARD E. PEnNv &JoHN- T. CAcioppo, ArITUDES AND PERSUASION:
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 252 (1981); see also WILLIAM C.
BROWN, RICHARD E. PETrY & JOHN T. CAcIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986).

95. Derek D. Rucker & Richard E. Petty, Increasingthe Effectiveness of Communications to Consumers: Recommendations Based on Elaboration Likelihood and
Attitude Certainty Perspectives,J. PuB. POL'Y & MARKETING 39, 40 (2006).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 44.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 45.

of N.Y.U. Journal and Law & Business
Imaged with Permission
HeinOnline -- 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 68 2010

2010]

PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURES

When processing information, people choose strategies
based on the following four goals: (1) maximizing the accuracy of the choice, (2) minimizing the cognitive effort required to make the choice, (3) minimizing the experience of
negative emotion when making the choice, and (4) maximizing the ease ofjustifying the choice.1 00 The first two goals trigger a cognitive cost-benefit balancing that helps explain why
people tend to process complex information based on simplifying heuristics. 0 1 When decisions need to be evaluated by
other people, the interplay of the last three goals helps explain
why decision-makers tend to defer to the preferences of people to whom they are accountable. Such a strategy is easier to
justify and it minimizes cognitive costs and negative emotions
that often arise from knowingly making choices that run con10 2
trary to other people's preferences.
According to the above cognitive science findings, there
are a few notable deficiencies in credit rating agencies' performance disclosures under the current regulation. First, the
disclosures fail to provide simplifying heuristics that help viewers of the disclosures in processing the information embedded
in the performance data. The disclosures come in the form of
transition matrices and records of rating actions that are not
immediately comparable and require extensive manual treatment to discover inconsistencies. The disclosures do not juxtapose completed performance measurements of different agencies, therefore, viewers cannot quickly comprehend the relative performances of rating agencies simply through
examining the disclosure documents. The disclosures have
merely made data available, but have failed to make them easily processable. As a result, the brand name of a credit rating
agency remains the most convenient (and powerful) heuristic
that debt issuers and investors can rely on in inferring an
agency's quality.
Second, a high "elaboration" level necessary for processing complex information requires a strong motivation on the
part of the processor. However, there is nothing in the current
100. SeeJames R. Bettman, Mary Frances Luce & John W. Payne, Constructive Consumer Choice Preferences, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 193 (1998).
101. See Don N. Kleinmuntz & David A. Schkade, Information Displays and
Decision Processes, 4 PSYCHOL. Sci. 221, 224 (1993).
102. See Bettman, Luce & Payne, supra note 100, at 197-98.
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regulation that motivates debt issuers to scrutinize the performance disclosures and select credit rating agencies based
on their performance records. Merit-based selection is not
mandated in statutes, SEC rules or case law. Although corporate directors and officers owe shareholders a fiduciary duty to
manage corporate affairs with reasonable diligence, they have
significant leeway under the business judgment rule and are
liable only for self-dealing or gross negligence) 0 3 To date
there has been no case law suggesting that directors and officers violate the business judgment rule if they select credit
rating agencies based on factors other than the latter's performance measurements.
Third, a debt issuer's selection of rating agencies is evaluated, if not directly dictated, by investors in debt securities. Investors typically expect credit ratings to come from a brand
name in the subject-rating sector and view any deviation from
the prevalent norm with suspicion. 10 4 Deferring to investors'
expectation seems to be a strategy that is easiest to justify. Unfortunately, the current regulation has not made any performance-based choice similarly easy to justify to debt investors.
The disclosures do not provide performance measurements of
credit rating agencies in an easily comparable form, so debt
issuers cannot point to an authoritative ranking of the historical performance of credit rating agencies and say: "I choose
Agency Unknown over Moody's because it has the best records
in the past three years."
The deficiencies in credit rating agencies' disclosures cast
doubt on their effectiveness in conveying information on rating qualities and influencing debt issuers' behavior in ways intended by the SEC. The next section empirically tests the effectiveness of the disclosures by examining how performance
statistics have indeed impacted debt issuers' selection of credit
rating agencies in the past decade.

103. See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988).
104. See Fabian Dittrich, The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and
Regulation, 75-76 (July 13, 2007) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Cologne), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract991821 (discussing
further reasons for the two-rating norm).
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III.
EMPImCAL ANALYSIS

A.

Description of Data

This study examines the relationship between the market
share of credit rating agencies with their past performance to
see whether performance statistics have influenced debt issuers' selection of credit rating agencies. If the answer is yes,
then the performance disclosures required under the current
regulation can function as an effective reputational sanction
for agencies with inferior performances and as an aid for lessestablished rating agencies to break the entry barrier by establishing their own superior performance records. Ratings of
registered NRSROs can roughly be classified into three main
categories: corporate securities and issuer ratings, sovereign
debt ratings, and structured finance ratings for asset-backed
securities. 1 5 Ratings for each of these categories can be further divided into long-term, short-term, and outlook ratings.
This study focuses on long-term corporate ratings, which include long-term ratings for industrial corporations, financial
institutions and insurance companies.
The long-term corporate rating sector is selected for study
in this paper because it is "mature" in the sense that there are
few fundamental differences in the methodologies used by different credit rating agencies, and so variations in their market
share cannot be attributed to debt issuers' preference of one
rating methodology over another. In addition, because the
long-term corporate rating market is dominated by a few agencies, it provides a good setting for studying the effect of performance statistics on market share when the entry barrier is
high.
Although Form NRSRO requires rating agencies to disclose performance statistics for the past one-, three- and tenyear periods, this study examines only the impacts of one- and
three-year performance statistics. This is because long-term ratings for a corporation often exist for less than ten years due to
corporate dissolutions or ratings that were discontinued due
to lack of sufficient information for the assessment of the debt
105. See Application for Registration as a Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organization (Form NRSRO), Item 6.A., available at http://
www.sec.gov/about/forms/formnrsro.pdf.
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issuer's credit risk. When this smaller sample base is further
divided based on sectors and industries, there is often limited
rating data available for a meaningful calculation of ten-year
10
performance statistics.

6

This study uses market share and performance data of
seven credit rating agencies that are currently registered as
NRSROs. These agencies are: Moody's, Standard & Poor's,
Fitch, DBRS, A.M. Best, JCR, and R&I. 10 7 For any specified
time period, the market share of a credit rating agency in any
rating sector is defined as the number of issuer-paid new ratings assigned by the rating agency divided by the total number
of new ratings of all rating agencies in the sector. The number
of new ratings is obtained from the "Ten-Percent Rating Sample" made available to the public under Exchange Act Rule
1 7 g-2. Except for Moody's, the rating sample of every agency
has specified whether a rating action is an upgrade, downgrade, confirmation, or new rating. Moody's sample provides a
unique ID for all rating actions on the same debt issues of an
issuer. The occurrence of new ratings and the dates of their
assignment can be identified by sorting the data in chronologi106. For a discussion of the lack of meaningful ten-year performance statistics, see, for example, DBRS, Inc., 2009 Annual Certification (Form NRSRO), 21 (2010), available at http://www.dbrs.com/research/215034/
exhibit-i .pdf.
107. Three other agencies - Realpoint LLC, LACE Financial, and EganJones - are also registered NRSROs, but the first agency specializes in rating
structured finance products (a sector that is beyond the scope of this paper),
while the last two do not charge issuers for their ratings: they rely instead on
fees paid by subscribers to their ratings to support their business operations.
See Notice of Order Granting Registration of Realpoint LLC as a Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,361-62 (june 23,
2008); Notice of Order Granting Registration of Lace Financial Corp. as a
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 73 Fed. Reg. 8,720-21
(Feb. 11, 2008); Notice of Order Granting Registration of Egan-Jones Rating
Company to Add Two Additional Classes of Credit Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg.
75,144 (Dec. 10 2008), Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations ("NRSROs"), Commission Orders Granting NRSRO Registration, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm. For a discussion of Realpoint's rating sectors, see Realpoint, https://www.real
point.com/RPLogin.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2010). For a discussion of
LACE Financial's business model, see Overview, LACE FINANCIAL CoRP.,
http://www.lacefinancial.com/Out/about/index.aspx (last visited Aug. 17,
2010). For a discussion of Egan-Jones' business model, see Egan-Jones Ratings Co. (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.egan-jones.com.
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cal order and taking count of the first appearance of a new ID
entry.
Performance statistics of credit rating agencies are calculated based on a complete record of rating actions maintained
by Bloomberg, whose records can be searched by rating sector,
rating type (i.e., long-term, short-term or outlook), rating
date, and the issuer's industry and country origin. In addition
to the above searchable items, the Bloomberg data also show
the agency's current and previous rating, and can be
downloaded into Excel.
B.

The Market Share of Rating Agencies

Each credit rating agency subject to this study has registered as an NRSRO for ratings on corporate issuers, financial
institutions, and insurance companies.1 0 8 The agencies' market shares in these sectors are shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4 below.
Table 2 shows the number of ratings outstanding as of the
end of 2009 as reported in each rating agency's Form NRSRO. 109 The numbers include both issuer-paid and unsolicited
ratings. They provide a snapshot of market share allocation in
rating industrial corporations, financial institutions and insurance companies.
108. The rating agencies' respective copies of Form NRSRO can be viewed
at: Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC, Application for Registration

as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (Form NRSRO)
(Sep. 22, 2010), available at Standard & Poor's, http://www.standardand

poors.com/ratings/form-nrsro/en/us; Moody's, Moody's Investor Services,
Inc., Form NRSRO (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://v3.moodys.com/
Publishinglmages/MCO/nrsroapplication.pdf; DBRS, Fitch, Inc., Form NRSRO (Mar. 30, 2010) availableat http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/
nrsro/nav/NRSROannualcertification_2010.pdf; A.M. Best, DBRS Limited, Form NRSRO (Sep. 3, 2010), available atJCR, http://www.dbrs.com/

research/215033/formNRSROjcr.co.jp/english/nrsro/pdf/Update_2010
0809.pdf; A.M. Best Company, Inc., Form NRSRO (Mar. 29, 2010), available

at R&I, http://www.ambest.comri.co.jp/eng/regulatory-affair/nrsro/Form
_NRSRO_AnnualCertificationMarch_2010.pdf.html; Japan Credit Rating
Agency,

Ltd.,

Form

NRSRO

(Aug. 4,

2010),

available at http://

www.jcr.co.jp/english/nrsro/pdf/ Update_20100809.pdf; Rating and Investment Information, Inc., Form NRSRO (June 1, 2010), available at http://

www.r-i.co.jp/eng/regulatory-affair/nrsro.html.
109. Id.
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NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING RATINGS
AT THE END OF 2009
Industrial
Corporation

Financial
Institution

Insurance
Company

# of
Ratings

Market
Share

# of
Ratings

Market
Share

# of
Ratings

Market
Share

Standard & Poor's

41,400

43.2%

52,500

24.0%

8,600

35.5%

Moody's
Fitch

31,008
12,613

32.3%
13.1%

76,801
72,311

35.1%
33.0%

5,455
4,599

22.5%
19.0%

DBRS

5,350

5.6%

16,630

7.6%

120

0.5%

A.M. Best
JCR
R&I

2,246
518
2,807

2.3%
0.5%
2.9%

3
156
495

0.0%
0.1%
0.2%

5,364
31
46

22.2%
0.1%
0.2%

Total

95,942

218,896

24,215

Table 3, Panel A shows the allocation of issuer-paid ratings for the period of 2000-2009. The "# of Ratings" listed in
the Panel are smaller in scale than those in Table 2 for a number of reasons. First, the numbers in Panel A are obtained
from the Ten-Percent Rating Sample reported by the rating
agencies under Exchange Act Rule 17 g-2. Thus, they reflect
only ten percent of the actual number of new ratings. Second,
the numbers in Panel A include only issuer-paid ratings while
the numbers in Table 2 include both issuer-paid and unsolicited ratings. Third, the numbers in Panel A include only longterm ratings, while the numbers in Table 2 include all ratings
(i.e., long-term, short-term, and outlook).
Debt issuers often have multiple issuances that require
credit ratings. The numbers in Panel A are issue-based such
that each debt issue of the same issuer takes one count. However, if two rating agencies each rated 100 debt issues in any
given time period, and one agency's ratings were mostly for
multiple issues of a small number of issuers while the other
agency's ratings were mostly for different issuers, the two agencies' market positions should be different. Therefore, Table 3,
Panel B further shows market share in terms of the number of
rated issuers as opposed to issues. Tables 2 and 3 paint a
highly consistent picture of how market share is allocated
among the listed rating agencies.
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TABLE

3 MARKET SHARE ALLOCATION DURING 2000 - 2009

Panel A Number of Issuer-Paid Ratings During 2000 - 2009*
Industrial
Corporation

Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Fitch
DBRS
A.M. Best
JCR
R&I
Total

Financial
Institution

Insurance
Company

# of
Ratings

Market
Share

# of
Ratings

Market
Share

# of
Ratings

Market
Share

3,205
2,334
1,269
211
0
266
223

42.7%
31.1%
16.9%
2.8%
0.0%
3.5%
3.0%

4,759
8,935
5,759
593
0
28
17

23.7%
44.5%
28.7%
3.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.1%

493
510
165
0
798
0
0

25.1%
25.9%
8.4%
0.0%
40.6%
0.0%
0.0%

7,508

20,091

1,966

Panel B Number of Issuers Rated During 2000-2009*
Industrial
Corporation

Standard & Poor's
Moody's
Fitch
DBRS
A.M. Best
JCR
R&I

Financial
Institution

Insurance
Company

# of
Ratings

Market
Share

# of
Ratings

Market
Share

# of
Ratings

Market
Share

1,550
1,495
650
74
0
59
117

39.3%
37.9%
16.5%
1.9%
0.0%
1.5%
3.0%

501
1,435
626
164
0
5
8

18.3%
52.4%
22.9%
6.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.3%

239
244
71
0
423
0
0

24.5%
25.0%
7.3%
0.0%
43.3%
0.0%
0.0%

2,739
977
Total
3,945
Based on the Ten-Percent Rating Sample reported by each rating agency pursuant
to Exchange Act Rule 17g-2.
*

Market Share in Industrial Corporate Ratings:
Standard & Poor's and Moody's are dominating long-term
industrial corporate ratings. Standard & Poor's market share,
whether issue or issuer-based, is about 40%, while Moody's issue-based market share is about 30% and issuer-based market
share is close to 40%. Fitch trails both with a market share of
about 13-16%.
DBRS is also a full-service rating agency. Formed in 1976,
it is known as a leading rating agency in Canada, but it has an
eye toward strengthening its position in the US and European
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markets. 110 It has established branch offices in New York and
Chicago, and has registered with regulatory authorities in Canada, the US, and Europe.11 DBRS's market share in the industrial corporate ratings is a fraction of that of the two dominant companies in the field: it held a slight 5.6% share of outstanding ratings at the end of 2009, and less than 3% of issuebased new ratings and less than 2% of issuer-based new ratings
during 2000-2009.
A.M. Best is a boutique rating agency that specializes in
insurance company ratings. Although it reported 2,246 "corporate" ratings outstanding as of the end of 2009, the subjects
of these ratings were all insurance companies or debts issued
by insurance companies. 112 This is also the case with A.M.
Best's "corporate issuer" ratings reported in its Ten-Percent
Rating Sample. 113 Such ratings would have been categorized
as insurance company ratings by other agencies."l 4 For consistency in the definition of rating sectors used in this study, insurance companies are removed from A.M. Best's "corporate"
rating category and included in the "insurance" rating category. This results in an entry of "0" for the number of industrial corporate ratings in Table 3.
JCR and R&I are both based in Japan. They jointly held
less than 7% of all issue-based new ratings and less than 5% of
issuer-based new ratings during 2000 - 2009. Moreover, issuers
included in their Ten-Percent Rating Samples were all Japanese companies.

110. For a discussion of DBRS's strategic plan, see Walter Schroeder,
Chairman's Message, DBRS, INC., http://www.dbrs.com/about/chairmans
Message (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
111. For a discussion of DBRS's rating business, see DBRS Productsand Services, DBRS, INC., http://www.dbrs.com/about/products (last visited Aug.
17, 2010).
112. This information is based on an examination of the complete rating
actions since June 26, 2007 reported by A.M. Best under Exchange Act Rule
17g-2(d) (3), and an examination of the complete rating actions recorded in
Bloomberg for the relevant period.
113. This information is based on an examination of A.M. Best's Ten Percent Rating Sample for the time period of 2000-2009.
114. This information is based on an examination of the Ten Percent Rating Samples of all rating agencies included in this study.
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Market Share in FinancialInstitution Ratings:
Moody's is the market leader in this sector, accounting for
35% of outstanding ratings at the end of 2009, and 44% issuebased and 52% issuer-based new ratings during 2000-2009.
Fitch ranks second with a market share of 33%, 28% and 23%,
respectively, in the above measures. Standard & Poor's takes
the third place with a market share ranging from 20% to 25%.
Jointly these "Big Three" agencies have more than 90% of the
market share in financial institution ratings. DBRS' share is insubstantial at 6-8%. A.M. Best and the two Japanese rating
agencies are inactive in this field.
Market Share in Insurance Company Ratings:
A.M. Best's reputation as an agency specializing in rating
the insurance industry is consistent with the data in this field.
Its 40% share of new long-term ratings (issue as well as issuerbased) assigned during 2000-2009 attests to its dominance.
A.M. Best's market share based on the 2009 Form NRSRO
trails behind that of Standard & Poor's, but that gap would
close substantially if the 2,246 ratings mis-categorized as "corporate" were included in the insurance sector: A.M. Best's
share would have been 28.7% while Standard & Poor's would
have been 32%.
Based on the numbers in Table 3, Panels A and B,
Moody's ties with Standard & Poor's in long-term insurance
company ratings with each agency taking about 25% of the
market share. Fitch's position is relatively insubstantial at 78%. DBRS, JCR and R&I have shown little rating activities in
this field.
Table 4 compares the market share allocation during the
three-year period before, and the three-year period after, the
enactment of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006.
The enactment of this statute and the occurrence of the financial crisis in the ensuing years have lead to a wide publicity of
the problems in the credit rating industry. Therefore, it is at
least possible that the investment community has paid more
attention in the post-2006 period to the performance record
of credit rating agencies when deciding which agency should
rate a particular debt issue. The purpose of Table 4 is to examine whether the post-2006 period has seen any shift in the
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market share allocation away from the pattern that was primarily built on brand name recognitions in previous years.
TABLE

4 COMPARISON OF MARKET SHARE BEFORE AND AFTER
THE 2006 CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM ACT

Panel A Market Share Based on the Number of Issuer-Paid Ratings
Financial
Industrial
Insurance
Company
Institution
Corporation
After
Before
After
Before
After
Before
19.1%
Standard & Poor's 47.0%
39.9%
22.6%
22.6% 27.8%
23.4%
26.4%
Moody's
42.8%
44.6%
21.5%
37.5%
5.5%
11.9%
Fitch
31.3%
19.8%
16.7%
30.5%
1.4%
0.0%
0.0%
4.4%
0.3%
3.8%
DBRS
0.0%
43.3%
42.6%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
A.M. Best
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
4.5%
1.7%
0.2%
JCR
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
2.8%
3.8%
0.1%
R&I
Panel B Market Share Based on
Industrial
Corporation
Before
After
25.4%
Standard & Poor's 30.2%
Moody's
49.9%
60.7%
13.9%
10.7%
Fitch
DBRS
2.4%
0.3%
0.0%
0.0%
A.M. Best
1.4%
0.3%
JCR
R&I
2.1%
2.6%

the Number of Issuers Rated
Insurance
Financial
Institution
Company
After
Before
After
Before
17.4%
15.8%
23.3%
18.8%
56.5%
46.6%
21.6%
24.0%
8.3%
6.4%
17.5%
32.7%
7.9%
0.0%
0.0%
4.1%
50.8%
0.0% 46.8%
0.0%
0.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.5%

Although there are some re-allocations of market share
among rating agencies in the post-2006 period, the basic allocation pattern appears to be the same with the "Big Three"
agencies still dominating industrial corporate and financial institution ratings and A.M. Best leading the insurance rating
sector. To ascertain whether the re-allocations in the post-2006
period are statistically significant, a percentage of change is
calculated by dividing the change in a rating agency's market
share by its pre-2006 market share. The sum of this percentage
across all rating agencies is examined against a distribution
bootstrapped from the values of the observed percentage
changes. The sum of the observed percentage changes for
each rating sector falls in the region of the 50th percentile of
the bootstrapped distribution, suggesting a lack of statistical
significance in the changes in market share allocations in the
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post-2006 era. This result holds whether market share is calculated based on the number of issuer-paid ratings or based on
the number of issuers rated. 115 The lack of significant change
in market share allocations is also confirmed in a Kendall's
Tau test. l a6
C.

The Performance Records

1. Performance Measures and Their Calculations
The current regulation requires each credit rating agency
registered as an NRSRO to disclose its rating performance in
terms of historical default rates and rating transitions. Performance statistics embedded in a transition matrix include
the default ratio, the ratio of "fallen angels," and rating stability measured by the frequency of rating changes, especially the
frequency of large rating changes. Some rating agencies also
use the average time to default, the cumulative accuracy profile (or Gini coefficients) 117 and the accuracy ratio1 18 to meal15. The conserve space, the ranges of the mid 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th, and
90th percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution are not included in this
paper, but the author will make this information available upon request.
116. The coefficients in the test are all positive and significantly different
from zero. For market share based on the number of ratings, the Kendall's
tau coefficients for the industrial corporate, financial institution and insurance company ratings are: 0.81, 0.90, and 0.89, respectively. For market
share based on the number of issuers rated, the Kendall's tau coefficients for
the industrial corporate, financial institution and insurance company ratings
are: 0.81, 1.00, and 0.89, respectively. These coefficients are significantly different zero with p-values ranging from 0.002 to 0.01. For a detailed discussion of the Kendall's tau test, see generally M.G. Kendall, A New Measure of
Rank Correlation,30 BIOMETRICA, 81-93 (1938).
117. See, e.g., Default, Transition, and Recovery: 2009 Annual Global Corporate
Default Study and Rating Transitions, STANDARD & POOR'S RATING SERVICES,
Table 1 (2010), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/
articles/en/us/?assetD=1245207201119. The cumulative accuracy profile is
constructed by plotting, for each rating category, the proportion of defaults
accounted for by firms with the same or a lower rating against the proportion of all firms with the same or a lower rating.
118. See, e.g., Corporate Rating Accuracy Improves, Volatility and Default Rates
Decline, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, (Aug. 4, 2010), available at
v3.moodys.com/ratings-process/About-Credit-Policy/001001 +Moody's+
accuracyratio&cd=4&h=en&ct-clnk&gl=us. The accuracy ratio is the ratio of
the area between the cumulative accuracy profile curve and the 45-degree
line to the maximum possible area above the 45-degree line, which is onehalf.
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sure rating performances, but the default, "fallen angels" and
stability ratios are universally accepted as important measures
by all rating agencies in assessing their own performance.
Therefore, those parameters are used in evaluating rating
agencies' performance in this study.
The default ratio is the ratio of the total number of defaults to the total number of ratings that a rating agency has
assigned during a specified time period. The "fallen angels"
ratio is the total number of ratings that were of investment
grade at the start of the period but migrated to a non-investment grade or a default rating by the end of the period, divided by the total number of investment grade ratings that the
rating agency has assigned during the period. The rating
change ratio is the total number of rating changes divided by
the total number of ratings assigned during a specified period.
The large rating change ratio is the total number of large rating changes divided by the total number of ratings assigned
during a specified period. In this regard, the number of large
rating changes is defined as the number of ratings that have
experienced changes of three or more notches during an annual period.' 19
In this study, performance statistics are calculated for
each year, and for each moving three years, during the period
of 2000-2009. This corresponds to the one-year and three-year
performance disclosure requirements in the current regulation. If past performance matters at all in a debt issuer's selection of credit rating agencies, then many, if not all, of these
statistics should have a significant explanatory power with respect to market shares of the rating agencies.
2.

Summary Performance Statistics

Summary Performance Statistics of Industrial CorporateRatingsThe summary statistics of the default ratio, "fallen angels"
ratio, the rating change ratio, and the large rating change ratio for industrial corporate ratings are reported in Table 5.
119. For a discussion of special comment, rating performance measurements, see Richard Cantor & Christopher Mann, Measuringthe Performance of
Corporate Bond Ratings, MooDY's INVESTOR'S SERVICE (2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=996025.
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TABLE 5 SUMMARY PERFORMANCE STATISTICS OF
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATE RATINGS
"Fallen
Rating Change Large Rating
Default Ratio Angels" Ratio
Ratio
Change Ratio
One- Three- One- Three- One- Three- One- Threeyear years year years
year
years
year
years

Standard & Poor's
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard

0.05
0.05

0.06
0.05

0.04

0.04

0.06
0.04

0.09
0.07

0.04

0.06

0.01
0.01

0.02
0.01

Deviation 0.02

0.02

0.02
0.01

0.02
0.01

0.02

0.01

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

Deviation N/A

N/A

Deviation

0.07
0.06
0.03

0.10
0.09
0.03

1.23
1.28
0.33

1.81
1.88
0.34

0.05
0.03
0.03

0.06
0.06
0.03

0.07
0.06
0.03

0.10
0.08
0.03

1.11
1.15
0.21

1.60
1.58
0.22

0.04
0.03
0.02

0.05
0.05
0.03

0.07
0.05
0.04

0.09
0.08
0.04

0.97
0.94
0.28

1.33
1.34
0.32

0.04
0.03
0.03

0.05
0.04
0.03

0.03
0.02
0.03

0.04
0.04
0.02

0.81
0.92
0.47

1.00
0.93
0.46

0.02
0.02
0.03

0.02
0.02
0.02

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

0.05
0.05
0.03

0.85
0.88
0.20

1.07
1.10
0.11

0.01
0.01
0.01

0.01
0.01
0.01

0.46
0.36
0.26

0.84
0.82
0.14

0.01
0.003
0.01

0.01
0.01
0.01

Moody's
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard

Deviation

Fitch
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard

DBRS
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
A.M. Best
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard

JCR
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard

Deviation

0.01
0.01

0.005
0.005

0.01

0.003

0.06
0.05
0.05

0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00

0.03
0.02

0.04
0.03

0.00

0.00

0.04

0.04

R&I
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard

Deviation

In terms of the default ratio, Moody's and Standard &
Poor's stand out as the worst performers. Moody's annual default ratio has a mean of 0.06, followed by Standard & Poor's

(0.05), DBRS (0.02), Fitch (0.01), JCR (0.009), and R&I (0).
The moving three-year default ratio follows the same pattern;
120
these differences are statistically significant.
120. For the annual default ratio, the t-test for the difference in the mean
between Moody's and DBRS, Moody's and Fitch, Moody's and JCR, Moody's
and R&I, shows a p-value of 0.001, 0.0004, <.0001, and <.0001, respectively.
The p-values for the difference in the mean between Standard & Poor's and
the above entities (other than Moody's) are 0.17, 0.08, 0.03, and 0.004, respectively. For the moving three-year default ratio, the p-values are <.0001
across the board between Moody's and other agencies (except for Standard
& Poor's). The p-values for the difference in the mean between Standard &
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In terms of the "fallen angels" ratio, Moody's, Standard &
Poor's, and Fitch also have an inferior record compared to the
smaller rating agencies. This record holds true whether the
basis.
ratio is calculated annually or on a moving three-year
121
Most of the differences are statistically significant.
In terms of the rating change ratio, the "Big Three" agencies have higher ratios than their less-established peers, underlining their inferiority in maintaining rating stability. Most of
the differences between the smaller agencies and Moody's and
12 2
Standard & Poor's, respectively, are statistically significant.
The differences between Fitch and DBRS, and between Fitch
and JCR, are insignificant, but the differences between Fitch
and R&I are significant) 23 The large rating change ratio follows a similar pattern, and most of the differences between the
"Big Three" agencies and smaller agencies are statistically significant.12 4
Poor's and the above entities (other than Moody's) are 0.01, 0.01, 0.0005,
and 0.0002, respectively. There is no significant difference in the mean default ratio between Moody's and Standard & Poor's.
121. For the annual ratio, the t-tests for the differences in the mean between Moody's and DBRS, Moody's and R&I, Standard & Poor's and DBRS,
Standard & Poor's and R&I, and Fitch and R&I have p-values of 0.06, 0.03,
0.07, 0.004, and 0.08, respectively. For the moving three-year ratio, the pvalues are 0.01, 0.05, 0.01, 0.003, 0.3, 0.01, 0.03, 0.17, and 0.04, respectively,
for the differences between Moody's and DBRS, Moody's and JCR, Moody's
and R&I, Standard & Poor's and DBRS, Standard & Poor's and JCR, Standard & Poor's and R&I, Fitch and DBRS, Fitch andJCR, and Fitch and R&I.
122. For the annual rating change ratio, the p-values in the t-test for any
difference in the mean between Moody's and DBRS, JCR, and R&I are 0.12,
0.23, and <.0001, respectively. The p-values for the difference in the mean
between Standard & Poor's and each of the above smaller agencies are 0.01,
0.02, and <.0001, respectively. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values
for the difference between Moody's and the above smaller agencies are
0.0005, 0.0003, and <.0001, respectively. The p-values for the difference between Standard & Poor's and the above smaller agencies are all less than
0.0001.
123. For the annual ratio, the p-values of the t-test for the difference in the
mean between Fitch and each of DBRS, JCR, and R&I are: 0.74, 0.89, and
0.0009, respectively. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values are: 0.15,
0.41, and 0.001, respectively.
124. For the annual large rating change ratio, the p-values in the t-test for
any difference in the mean between Moody's and DBRS, JCR, and R&I are
0.64, 0.11, and 0.01, respectively. The p-values for the difference in the mean
between Standard & Poor's and each of the above smaller agencies are 0.09,
0.005, and 0.0003, respectively. The p-values for the difference in the mean
between Fitch and each of the above smaller agencies are 0.57, 0.09, and
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Recall from the above discussion that Standard & Poor's
and Moody's dominate the long-term industrial corporate rating sector with a combined share of about 75% of the total
new ratings in the past decade, and the aggregate market
share of smaller agencies is less than 10%. This allocation of
market share is disproportionate to the ranking of the agencies' performance. It could be argued that because JCR and
R&I are boutique firms specializing in rating Japanese companies, they could not compete with firms such as Moody's or
Standard & Poor's on a global basis. DBRS, on the other hand,
is a full-service firm with a presence in the US, Europe and
Canada. Its slight 3% market share certainly cannot be justified by its performance. Moreover, Fitch ties with Standard &
Poor's and Moody's in all performance measures and is an established global agency. However, Fitch's market share of less
than 17% pales in comparison with Standard & Poor's 40%
and Moody's 30%.
Summary Performance Statistics of FinancialInstitution Ratings.
Summary performance statistics of financial institution
ratings are reported in Table 6. In terms of the default ratio,
the "Big Three" agencies again have underperformed the
smaller agencies. The mean ratios forJCR, and R&I are either
zero or near zero while the mean ratios for the "Big Three"
range between 0.01 and 0.02. These differences are statistically
significant. 125 DBRS also has lower mean default ratios than
the "Big Three," although the differences are insignificant for
0.01, respectively. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values for the difference between Moody's and the above smaller agencies are 0.07, 0.002, and
0.001, respectively. The p-values for the difference between Standard &
Poor's and the above smaller agencies are 0.04, <.0001, and <.0001, respectively. The p-values for the difference in the mean between Fitch and each of

the above smaller agencies are 0.07, 0.002, and 0.0004, respectively.
125. For the annual default ratio, the p-values in the t-test for the difference in the mean between Moody's and A.M. Best, JCR, and R&I, respectively, are 0.01, 0.02, and 0.01. The p-values for the difference between Standard & Poor's and the above smaller agencies are 0.003, 0.01, and 0.004,
respectively. The p-values for the difference between Fitch and the above
smaller agencies are 0.43, 0.84, and 0.54, respectively. For the moving threeyear default ratio, the p-values for the difference in the mean between
Moody's and A.M. Best, JCR, and R&I, respectively, are <.0001, 0.0003, and

<.0001. The p-values for the difference between Standard & Poor's and the
above smaller agencies are <.0001, 0.001, and <.0001, respectively. The p-
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the annual ratio and for the three-year ratio as between DBRS
126
and Fitch.
TABLE

6

SUMMARY PERFORMANCE STATISTICS OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION RATINGS

Default Ratio

Standard & Poor's
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
Moody's
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
Fitch
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
DBRS
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
A.M. Best
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
JCR
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
R&I
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation

"Fallen
Angels"
Ratio

Rating
Change
Ratio

Large Rating
Change
Ratio

Oneyear

Three- One- Three- One- Three- One- Threeyear years
year years year years
years

0.02
0.01
0.02

0.02
0.02
0.01

0.04
0.03
0.03

0.03
0.03
0.02

1.14
1.13
0.35

1.38
1.48
0.20

0.03
0.02
0.02

0.03
0.03
0.01

0.02
0.01
0.01

0.02
0.02
0.01

0.04
0.03
0.03

0.04
0.03
0.02

1.15
1.12
0.23

1.51
1.54
0.17

0.03
0.03
0.01

0.04
0.04
0.01

0.008
0.003
0.01

0.01
0.01
0.01

0.03
0.02
0.04

0.02
0.02
0.01

0.93
0.89
0.37

1.09
1.00
0.30

0.03
0.02
0.03

0.03
0.03
0.01

0.005
0.00
0.01

0.001
0.00
0.004

0.02
0.01
0.03

0.01
0.01
0.01

0.73
0.64
0.52

0.75
0.67
0.21

0.02
0.00
0.02

0.01
0.01
0.01

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

0.002
0.00
0.01

0.004
0.00
0.01

0.05
0.04
0.06

0.05
0.05
0.02

0.90
0.88
0.36

1.35
1.27
0.35

0.02
0.01
0.02

0.02
0.02
0.01

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.02
0.01
0.05

0.02
0.01
0.03

0.61
0.48
0.35

1.21
1.18
0.35

0.03
0.01
0.04

0.04
0.04
0.04

In terms of the "fallen angels" ratio, DBRS and R&I have
lower (and thus superior) ratios than all of the "Big Three"
agencies, although significance tests show that the differences
values for the difference between Fitch and the above smaller agencies are
0.07, 0.77, and 0.09, respectively.
126. The p-values in the t-test for any difference in the mean annual ratio
between DBRS and Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch, respectively, are
0.12, 0.16 and 1.00, respectively. The p-value for the difference in the mean
of the three-year ratios between DBRS and Moody's and between DBRS and

Standard & Poor's are less than 0.0001.
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are insignificant. 127 In terms of the rating change ratio, DBRS
again outperforms Moody's and Standard & Poor's, and their
differences are statistically significant. 128 Fitch also has lower
ratios than Moody's and Standard & Poor's, but their differences are mostly insignificant except for the three-year ratio
between Fitch and Moody's. 129 There is no significant difference between the ratios of Moody's and those of Standard &
Poor's.13 0 In terms of the large rating change ratio, the differences among rating agencies are mostly insignificant.13 1
Earlier discussions on market share allocations in the financial institution rating sector have shown that Moody's,
Standard & Poor's, and Fitch account for 44.5%, 23.7%, and
28% of the new ratings in the past decade, and account for
52.4%, 18.3%, and 22.9% of the number of issuers for which
new ratings were assigned. Yet Fitch outperforms Moody's in
terms of the three-year default ratio and three-year rating stability, and has other performance parameters that are not statistically different from Moody's. Moreover, Moody's and Standard & Poor's have comparable performance records, but
Moody's market share is about twice that of Standard & Poor's.
DBRS has superior records than Moody's in most performance
measures, yet DBRS's market share is no more than 8%.
Summary Performance Statistics of Insurance Company Ratings.
Table 7 reports the summary statistics of rating agencies'
performance in insurance company ratings. A.M Best is the
leader in this sector with about 40% of the market share. It has
outperformed the other agencies in terms of the rating
127. For the annual "fallen angels" ratio, the p-values of the t-tests for any
difference in the mean range from 0.97 to 1.00. For the moving three-year
ratio, the p-values range from 0.27 to 1.00.

128. For the annual rating change ratio, the p-values are 0.09 in both ttests. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values were <.0001 and 0.0001.

129. For the annual rating change ratio, the p-values are 0.74 and 0.75.
For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values are 0.02 and 0.2.
130. The p-values are 1.00 for the annual rating change ratio, and 0.95 for
the moving three-year rating change ratio.
131. For the annual large rating change ratio, the p-values of the t-tests for
any difference in the mean range from 0.60 to 1.00. For the moving threeyear ratio, the p-values of the t-tests for any difference in the mean between
DBRS and Moody's, and between DBRS and R&I are 0.05 and 0.03, respectively. The p-values of the t-tests for any difference among other rating agencies range from 0.15 to 1.00.
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change ratio, but its large rating change ratio is indistinguish132
able statistically from that of most of the other agencies.
Similarly, its "fallen angels" ratio and default ratio are not sta133
tistically different from those of the others.
TABLE

7

SUMMARY PERFORMANCE STATISTICS OF
INSURANCE COMPANY RATINGS

"Fallen
Rating
Angels"
Change
Large Rating
Ratio
Ratio
Change Ratio
Default Ratio
One- Three- One- Three- One- Three- One- Threeyear
years
year years
year years
year years
Standard & Poor's
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
Moody's
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
Fitch
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
DBRS
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
A.M. Best
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
JCR
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation
R&I
- Mean
- Medium
- Standard Deviation

0.01
0.01
0.01

0.02
0.02
0.01

0.06
0.06
0.03

0.06
0.05
0.03

1.13
1.19
0.46

1.50
1.54
0.42

0.04
0.02
0.05

0.04
0.04
0.02

0.01
0.02
0.02

0.02
0.02
0.01

0.04
0.03
0.03

0.04
0.05
0.01

1.18
1.19
0.35

1.70
1.71
0.34

0.04
0.03
0.04

0.06
0.06
0.03

0.01
0.00
0.02

0.01
0.01
0.01

0.03
0.02
0.03

0.04
0.04
0.02

0.92
1.00
0.49

1.19
1.28
0.44

0.03
0.02
0.04

0.04
0.04
0.02

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.08
0.00
0.16

0.04
0.00
0.05

0.91
0.78
0.57

1.23
1.47
0.41

0.01
0.00
0.03

0.03
0.00
0.04

0.07
0.01
0.14

0.07
0.02
0.09

0.01
0.01
0.02

0.01
0.01
0.01

0.25
0.00
0.35

0.27
0.04
0.37

0.005
0.00
0.01

0.004
0.0005
0.01

0.04
0.00
0.08

0.06
0.04
0.07

0.05
0.00
0.09

0.06
0.05
0.06

0.93
1.04
0.36

1.21
1.21
0.43

0.02
0.00
0.06

0.04
0.028
0.05

0.02
0.00
0.03

0.04
0.00
0.06

0.03
0.00
0.06

0.05
0.05
0.05

0.50
0.46
0.26

1.15
0.97
0.44

0.02
0.00
0.03

0.05
0.04
0.04

132. For the annual large rating change ratio, the p-values of the t-tests for
any difference between A.M. Best and other agencies range from 0.19 to
1.00. For the moving three-year ratios, the p-values of the t-tests for any difference between A.M. Best and Moody's, R&I, and S&P are 0.003, 0.02, and
0.098, respectively. The p-values of the t-tests for any difference among other
agencies range from 0.15 to 1.00.
133. For the annual rating change ratio, the p-values of the t-tests for any
difference between A.M. Best and DBRS, Fitch, JCR, Moody's, R&I, and
Standard & Poor's are 0.01, 0.002, 0.0016, <.0001, 0.72, and <.0001, respectively. For the moving three-year ratio, the p-values are 0.0002, <.0001,
<.0001, <.0001, 0.0003, and <.0001.
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Moody's and Standard & Poor's each has about 25% of
market share. Their rating performances in all measures are
statistically indifferent.13 4 Fitch is not significantly different
from Moody's and Standard & Poor's in terms of the default
ratio, the "fallen angel" ratio, and the large rating change ratio.135 Fitch's moving three-year rating change ratio is actually
better than that of Moody's, 13 6 yet Fitch's market share of insurance company ratings is a slight 8.4%. More interestingly,
DBRS's performance is not statistically different from that of
the "Big Three" agencies,1 3 7 yet its market share is negligible.
D.

The CorrelationBetween Market Share and Performance
Statistics

Table 8 reports two correlation measures between credit
rating agencies' market share and performance statistics: (1)
Pearson correlation 138 between rating agencies' number of issuer-paid new ratings in a year and their performance statistics
in the previous year, and (2) Pearson correlation between rating agencies' number of issuer-paid new ratings in a year and
their performance statistics in the three years immediately
before. Because low values of the performance parameters are
signs of superior rating performance, a negative and significant correlation between market share and performance statistics should exist if historical performance has played a part in
debt issuers' selection of rating agencies.
But the data shows a contrary relationship. The correlation is statistically significant for all performance measures in
industrial corporate ratings, and for most measures (except
the "fallen angels" ratio"), in financial institution ratings. How134. The p-values of t-tests of the difference in the mean range from 0.92
to 1.00.
135. The p-values of t-tests for any difference in the mean is 1.00 for default ratios, between 0.90 and 1.00 for "fallen angel" ratios, and between 0.78
and 1.00 for the large rating change ratio.
136. The p-value of the t-test was 0.01.
137. The t-tests show p-values ranging from 0.26 to 1.00.
138. The correlation between two variables is a number between -1and +1
that measures the degree to which the variables are related. The Pearson
correlation is the most common measure of such a relationship. It is obtained by dividing the covariance of the two variables by the product of their
standard deviations. For more discussion on the Pearson correlation, see ALLEN L. EDWARDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR REGRESSION AND CORRELATION
33-46 (Richard C. Atkinson et. al. eds., 1976).
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ever, the correlation is positive, suggesting that rating agencies
with higher ratios (hence inferior performance) are associated
with bigger market shares! The significance in the correlation
disappears in insurance company ratings except for the "fallen
angels."
TABLE

8

PEARSON CORRELATION OF MARKET SHARE
AND PEROFRMANCE STATISTICS

Industrial
Corporation

Financial
Institution

Insurance
Company

0.51
<.0001"*

0.47
0.0003**

-0.07
0.66

0.56
<.0001**

0.68
<.0001**

-0.10
0.54

One-year Default Ratio
- Correlation
- p-value

Three-year Default Ratio
- Correlation
- p-value

One-year "Fallen Angels"
- Correlation
- p-value

0.28
0.08*

0.34
0.01**

Three-year "Fallen Angels"
-

0.50
<.0001**

0.22
0.12

0.25
0.12

- Correlation
- p-value

0.60
<.0001**

0.51
<.0001**

0.23
0.14

0.68
<.0001**

0.44
0.001**

0.19
0.24

0.43
0.0001**

0.27
0.08*

0.28
0.13

0.46
0.002**

0.30
0.11

-

Correlation

p-value
One-year Rating Change
Three-year Rating Change
- Correlation
- p-value

One-year Large Rating Change
- Correlation
- p-value

Three-year Large Rating Change
0.57
- Correlation
<.0001"*
- p-value
** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level.

Though these correlations may seem awkward, they are
consistent with the market share data and the summary performance statistics shown in previous tables. Those tables show
inferior records of Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and to a great
extent, Fitch, relative to their less-established peers in almost
every performance measure, and yet they dominate industrial
corporate and financial institution ratings with a combined
market share of more than 90% in each sector. For insurance
company ratings, A.M. Best accounts for about 40% of the
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market share, and Moody's and Standard & Poor's each account for about 25% of the market share. Although A.M. Best
has the lowest mean "fallen angels" ratio, Moody's and Standard & Poor's have higher ratios than minor players such as
Fitch and Ratings & Investment. As a result, the correlation is
only significant at the 10% level as opposed to the 5% level.
1. MultivariateRegressions
The Regression Models.
This section reports the result of multivariate regressions
of market share on lagged performance statistics after controlling for factors such as the geographical origins of debt issuers
and rating agencies' pre-existing market positions in a given
rating sector.
In Table 9, Panel A, the dependent variable is a rating
agency's annual market share in each rating sector examined
in this study. This cross-sectional regression is based on a sample of 154 annual market share observations pooled from all
seven rating agencies across all rating sectors (i.e., industrial
corporate, financial institution, and insurance company ratings) during the period of 2000-2009. Independent performance variables include a rating agency's default ratio, "fallen
angels" ratio, the rating change ratio and the large rating
change ratio in the previous year and the previous three years.
A rating agency's market share in the previous three years 139 is
also included as an independent variable to control for the
agency's pre-existing market position (and also debt issuer's
exhibited preferences in selecting rating agencies) in a given
140
rating sector.
In Table 9, Panel B, the dependent variable is a rating
agency's market share in all new ratings for debt issuers that
are not in the agency's home region (the "Non-Domestic Issuer Ratings"). For example, if Moody's assigned 1,000 new
139. The three-year market share is calculated as the ratio of a rating
agency's new ratings in a particular rating sector in a three-year period to the
total new ratings assigned by all agencies during the same period.
140. Ideally, the regression model should control for variations in the rating fees charged by different rating agencies. However, such information is
proprietary in nature and is not made available to the public. Therefore, the
regression model and its results build on the assumption that all credit rating agencies are competitive in their ratings fees.
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ratings for industrial corporate issuers in 2008, and 500 of the
issuers were US companies, and if the aggregate number of
new ratings in this field was 5,000, and 2,000 of these ratings
were for US companies, Moody's market share in "Non-Domestic Issuer Ratings" in the industrial corporate sector for
2008 would be 16.7% (i.e., (1,000 - 500)/(5,000 - 2,000)).

A regression based on rating agencies' market shares in
"Non-Domestic Issuer Ratings" accounts for the possibility that
issuers' selection of a rating agency is influenced by the
agency's geographical convenience and cultural affinity with
the issuer. For example, DBRS is headquartered in Canada
and is a leading agency in that market. Variations in Canadian
companies' debt issuance from year to year may have contributed to the variations in DBRS's market share. Such a concern
exists for other agencies as well: Moody's and Standard &
Poor's are more likely to be preferred by US issuers, Fitch by
European issuers, A. M. Best by US insurance issuers, and JCR
and R&I by Japanese issuers.
In Table 9, Panel C, the regression uses the same model
as in Panel B except that the data sample is reduced to cover
the period of 2007 - 2009.141 As discussed earlier, this period
follows the enactment of the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act and coincides with the occurrence of a world-wide
financial crisis. As a result, this period exhibits a higher level of
public awareness of the problems of credit rating agencies.
The purpose of the regression shown in Panel C is to examine
whether the performance record of a credit rating agency has
affected its market share when there is at least a strong reason
for debt issuers and the investment community to pay attention to the performance record.
Table 10 differs from Table 9 in that the independent
performance variables are a rating agency's performance ranking scores in the previous year and the previous three years.
These scores are calculated by sorting the agencies' performance statistics for each parameter in ascending order and assigning a score of 1 for the worse performer and a score of 2
for the second-worst performer, and so on so forth until the
maximum number of 7 is reached. In any given year, the
scores of an agency for all annul performance measures in a
particular rating sector are added to obtain an overall annual141. There are 48 observations in this reduced sample.

Imaged with Permission
of N.Y.U. Journal 90 2010
Law & Business
HeinOnline -- 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. and

2010]

PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURES

performance ranking score of the agency for the rating sector
in that year. For example, if in 2008 Moody's is the worst performer among all rating agencies in industrial corporate ratings in terms of the annual default ratio, the "fallen angel"
ratio, the rating change ratio, and the large rating change ratio, its annual-performance ranking score for industrial corporate ratings for the year would be 4 (i.e., 1+1+1+1). The threeyear performance ranking scores are calculated in a similar
way.
Regression Results.
In Table 9, Panel A, the coefficients on most of the lagged
performance measures are statistically insignificant, suggesting
a lack of explanatory power of performance measures on rating agencies' market shares. The only performance variable
that is significant in this regression is the lagged one-year large
rating change ratio, but the coefficient has a positive sign. The
positive sign highlights a positive relation between market
share and this performance parameter such that higher large
rating change ratios (hence inferior rating stability) are actually associated with bigger market shares. This result is consistent with the summary statistics on market shares and performance records discussed in previous sections in that large rating
agencies have dominating market shares despite their inferior
rating stability. The pre-existing market position is the most
significant variable in this regression. This significance suggests that the market share allocation in the credit rating industry is path-dependant in the sense that rating agencies' preexisting market positions determine their respective market
shares for the current period: big agencies that have established a dominant position in a rating sector are likely to continue enjoying their competitive advantage even though their
performance records may lag behind their less-established
peers, whereas small agencies or new entrants to the market
are likely to maintain just an insubstantial share of the business even though they have outperformed big agencies in
every major measurement of rating quality. This path dependency is also consistent with the hypothesis that debt issuers
tend to select credit rating agencies based on the latter's name
recognitions.
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REGRESSION OF MARKET SHARE ON

PERFORMANCE STATISTICS
Panel A

Regression of Overall Market Share on Performance Statistics

Variable
Intercept
Lag One-year Default Ratio
Lag Three-year Default Ratio
Lag One-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio
Lag Three-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio
Lag One-year Rating Change Ratio
Lag Three-year Rating Change Ratio
Lag One-year Large Rating Change Ratio
Lag Three-year Large Rating Change Ratio
Pre-existing Market Position

Coefficient

Standard
Error***

t-Value

Pr > I t

0.01
0.06
0.15
-0.33
0.13
0.02
-0.0001
0.84
-0.41
0.85

0.03
0.34
0.43
0.22
0.26
0.03
0.03
0.47
0.47
0.06

0.19
0.16
0.36
-1.49
0.53
0.56
0.00
1.77
-0.87
14.19

0.85
0.87
0.72
0.14
0.60
0.58
0.99
0.08*
0.38
<.0001**

I

Adj. R-Sq: 0.76
Panel B

Regression of Market Share in Non-Domestic Issuer
Ratings on Performance Statistics

Variable
Intercept
Lag One-year Default Ratio
Lag Three-year Default Ratio
Lag One-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio
Lag Three-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio
Lag One-year Rating Change Ratio
Lag Three-year Rating Change Ratio
Lag One-year Large Rating Change Ratio
Lag Three-year Large Rating Change Ratio
Pre-existing Market Position

Coefficient

Standard
Error***

t-Value

Pr> Id

0.01
0.53
-0.22
-0.30
0.21
0.01
-0.005
0.82
-0.38
0.90

0.02
0.18
0.18
0.17
0.21
0.03
0.03
0.39
0.46
0.06

0.40
3.00
-1.23
-1.78
1.00
0.41
-0.18
2.08
-0.83
15.99

0.69
0.003**
0.22
0.08*
0.32
0.68
0.86
0.04**
0.41
<.0001**

Adj. R-Sq: 0.84
Panel C Regression of Market Share in Non-Domestic Issuer
Ratings on Performance Statistics in 2007 - 2009
Variable
Intercept
Lag One-year Default Ratio
Lag Three-year Default Ratio
Lag One-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio
Lag Three-year "Fallen Angels" Ratio
Lag One-year Rating Change Ratio
Lag Three-year Rating Change Ratio
Lag One-year Large Rating Change Ratio
Lag Three-year Large Rating Change Ratio
Pre-existing Market Position

Coefficient
0.03
0.47
-0.25
-0.69
0.57
-0.03
-0.03
0.89
0.15
1.08

Standard
Error***

I-Value

Pr > Itd

0.04
1.62
2.46
0.67
1.03
0.05
0.06
0.95
1.69
0.10

0.67
0.29
-0.10
-1.02
0.55
-0.58
-0.42
0.94
0.09
11.32

0.51
0.77
0.92
0.32
0.58
0.57
0.67
0.36
0.93
<.0001**

Adj. R-Sq: 0.87
*** Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard error. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at
10% level.
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TABLE 10 REGRESSION OF MARKET SHARE
ON PERFORMANCE RANKING

Panel A Regression of Overall Market Share on Performance Ranking

Intercept
Lag One-year Ranking Score
Lag Three-year Ranking Score
Pre-existing Market Position

Coefficient
0.09
-0.0004
-0.004
0.80

Standard
Error***
0.03
0.002
0.002
0.06

t-alue
2.91
-0.23
-1.88
12.71

Pr> It I
0.004
0.82
0.06*
<.0001**

Adj. R-Sq: 0.76
Panel B Regression of Market Share in Non-Domestic Issuer
Ratings on Performance Ranking

Intercept
Lag One-year Ranking Score
Lag Three-year Ranking Score
Pre-existing Market Position

Coefficient
0.08
-0.002
-0.001
0.85

Standard
Error***
0.03
0.002
0.002
0.06

-Value
2.63
-1.23
-0.73
13.28

Pr> It
0.01
0.22
0.46
<.0001**

Adj. R-Sq: 0.84
Panel C Regression of Market Share in Non-Domestic Issuer
Ratings on Performance Ranking in 2007 - 2009
Standard
Error***

It

t-Value
Pr >
I
Intercept
-0.01
0.04
-0.24
0.81
Lag One-year Ranking Score
0.001
0.003
0.51
0.61
Lag Three-year Ranking Score
-0.001
0.002
-0.42
0.68
Pre-existing Market Position
1.07
0.09
11.22
<.0001'*
Adj. R-Sq: 0.84
*** Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard error. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant
at 10% level.
Coefficient

The regression based on market share allocations of ratings for non-domestic issuers has revealed similar results. Table 9, Panel B shows again that the lagged market share is the
most significant variable in explaining the current period mar-

ket share allocations among credit rating agencies. Although
the default ratio and the large rating change ratio in the previ-

ous year also have significant explanatory power over the current-period market share allocation, the signs on their coefficients are positive, again suggesting that higher ratios (and

thus inferior rating performance) are actually associated with
higher market shares. The lagged one-year "fallen angels" ratio has a negative sign and is significant at 10% level, but the
significance disappears (hence lacks robustness) in regressions
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based on observations in more
recent years (see discussions on
14 2
Table 9, Panel C below).

Credit rating agencies' performance records remain irrelevant toward their market share allocations in the post-2006
era. Table 9, Panel C shows that none of the performance statistics has had any effect on credit rating agencies' market
shares in non-domestic issuer ratings. The lagged market share
is again the only significant explanatory variable, highlighting
the importance of credit rating agencies' pre-existing market
positions and name recognitions in debt issuers' selection of
credit rating agencies for the current period. It is interesting
to note the continued irrelevance of performance statistics in a
period of time when debt issuers are fully aware of the quality
problems in the credit rating industry!
The performance ranking of a credit rating agency is also
inconsequential. In Table 10, the coefficients on the rankings
were mostly insignificant, except for the lagged three-year
ranking in Panel A. However, the sign of the coefficient on
this performance variable is negative, meaning that agencies
with higher-ranking scores (hence superior overall performance) held lower market shares. Recall that the summary performance statistics discussed earlier in this paper have shown
that smaller agencies outperformed the "Big Three" in most
measures of performance. Smaller agencies' ranking scores
are higher but their market shares are lower, and this inequity
is borne out in the form of a negative correlation between
ranking scores and market shares.
The coefficient on the lagged market share is positive and
highly significant in all three panels. This significance suggests
again that an agency's pre-existing market position drives its
market share
In sum, this empirical study has failed to reveal any value
of performance disclosures in shaping market share allocations for the credit rating industry. Debt issuers have had access (at least indirectly through their financial advisors) to a
complete record of rating action data collected by reputable
data vendors such as Bloomberg, and the data is available in
the XBRL or comparable formats for easy downloading into
142. The significance also disappears in a regression based on observations in 2003 - 2009. The results of this robustness test will be provided to
interested audience upon request.
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popular data processing software, such as Excel. However,
there is no evidence debt issuers have considered ratings agencies' historical performances before making their selections.
Instead, debt issuers appear to be brand conscious and have
exhibited a tendency of selecting ratings agencies based on the
latter's pre-existing market positions and name recognitions.
As a result, top-performing agencies are not rewarded with
higher market shares and under-performing agencies are not
punished with diminished business opportunities. Once a powerful agency has established a strong foothold in the business,
it continues to enjoy a competitive advantage that cannot be
overtaken by new challengers, even when those newcomers
have earned superior performance records. The ability of performance disclosures to sanction or enhance an agency's reputation among potential clients is questionable under the current regulation.
IV.
REGULATORY POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The results of this study suggest that when an industry
(such as the credit rating industry) is dominated by brand
names, competing entities in the industry may not be able to
effectively signal the quality of their ratings by disclosing past
performance information in the form of large volumes of nonstandardized data. Such disclosures require extensive processing before being usable as a diagnostic tool for assessing and
comparing the quality of different producers. As a result, such
disclosures are unlikely to alter choice makers' tendency to use
brand names as the heuristic in inferring the quality of competing brands.
How should the current credit rating agency disclosures
be improved? In a seminal paper on how to design product
labels that effectively communicate risk factors to consumers
and allow them to compare risk factors across different products, James Bettman, John Payne, and Richard Staelin discussed the principles that should guide policy makers in designing disclosure documents so as to best facilitate informed
decisions. 14 3 These principles are: (1) Reducing the cognitive
effort and/or time needed to locate the externally available
143. Bettman, Payne & Staelin, supra note 80.
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information, retrieve any previously stored information, and
encode the newly provided information; (2) Reducing the cognitive effort and/or time needed to make risk-benefit tradeoffs
within a particular brand or alternative being considered; and
to make
(3) Reducing the cognitive effort and/or time needed
1 44
comparisons across different brands or alternatives.
Based on these principles as well as cognitive science and
consumer choice research findings discussed in the previous
part of this paper, credit rating agency disclosures can be improved in the following ways:
First, Reduce effort in information acquisition through a centralized
data repository.
Under the current regulation, credit rating agencies are
required to disclose historical rating actions on their websites.1 45 Although retrieving such information from individual
websites is not an overbearing task given the near ubiquitous
availability of high speed internet connections, this effort
could be further reduced by requiring all agencies to deposit
rating data at a centralized internet location. With a few clicks,
visitors to the website could locate all agencies that are subject
to the disclosure requirements, any agency's compliance status, and the scope of the agency's data coverage in terms of
time span, rating sectors, and data items.
Europe has made more progress in this regard than the
U.S. On April 23, 2009, the European Parliament approved
rules proposed by the Commission of the European Communities on credit rating agency regulations. The rules include a
mandate to the Committee of European Securities Regulators
("CESR") to create a publicly available central repository for
standardized data on credit ratings and credit rating agencies'
performance so that market participants can make industry-

144. Id. at 14.
145. See Nov. 2009 Adopting Release, supra note 6, at 67-69.
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wide comparisons. 146 Currently,
the central repository is in the
7
14
connection-testing phase.

Second, Reduce effort in information processing through enhanced
standardization.

Cognitive science literature has shown that the acquisition
of new knowledge appears to be greatly facilitated by the existence of previously acquired relevant knowledge that can be
used to form associations. In this regard, the use of common
formats and concepts in communication materials would facilitate a person's ability to successfully encode new information
once the format had been learned through prior experi148
ence.
As discussed earlier, there is a substantial degree of inconsistency in the performance statistics disclosed by credit rating
agencies in terms of rating sectors, rating grades/notches, rating symbols, and industry categorizations. These inconsistencies make comparing performance measurements across rating agencies a tedious and laborious task. On top of these substantive differences, there are also inconsistencies in data
format, variable names, and data items included in the performance disclosures. For example, Standard & Poor's uses
"Group Name" as the variable name for issuers' industries, 149
while JCR uses 'Issuer-Group" for the same purpose. 150 DBRS
reports the "Published Date" of its rating actions,15 1 while JCR
reports the "Rating Effective Date." Such inconsistencies
should be eliminated from future disclosures because they in146. See Commission, Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliamentand
of the Council on Credit Rating Agencies, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internalmarket/securities/docs/agencies/proposal-en.pdf. See also Press
Release, Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., Commission Adopts Proposal to Regu-

late Credit Rating Agencies (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1684&format=HTML&
aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr.
147. See CESR- Information on the CentralRepository for Credit Rating Agencies
Applyingfor Registration in the European Union, WORLDWIDE EXCHANGE INTELLI-

(Jul. 26, 2010), available at http://www.exchange-handbook.co.uk/
index.cfm?section=news&action=detail&id=91888.
148. See Bettman, Payne & Staelin, supra note 80, at 11.
149. See Standard & Poor's Rating History Information, supra note 72.
150. SeeJCR Ratings History Sample, supra note 76.
151. See Regulatory Affairs, DBRS.coM, http://www.dbrs.com/about/
regulatoryAffairs (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
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crease viewers' cognitive costs in encoding the new information.
Third, Motivate debt issuers to review performance statistics with
scrutiny.
A high cognitive elaboration level requires motivation on
the part of debt issuers to review credit rating agencies' performance statistics with care. To provide such a motivation,
the law could require a debt issuer to discuss, in its debt issuance registrations, 15 2 the rationales for choosing a particular
credit rating agency for rating the debt by referencing the latter's performance record. The law should not require the
debt issuer to choose only among certain top-ranked agencies
for the rating, as the issuer may have other compelling concerns (such as conflicts of interest) that make the top performers unsuitable for the job. However, by requiring debt issuers
to discuss the reasons for choosing a particular rating agency
in light of the agency's performance, the law provides a strong
motivation that has hitherto been missing for debt issuers to
examine credit rating agencies' performance data with careful
scrutiny.
Fourth, Use simplifying heuristics to facilitate in performance
comparison.
The cognitive science findings discussed previously in this
paper suggest that people's working memory has a limited capacity, and therefore, in order for information to be effectively
processed in tasks of short span, simplifying heuristics should
be used. Cognitive science also suggests that disclosures made
to audiences who lack a strong motivation to process the information must take the form of simple cues or associations in
order to be persuasive. 15 3 Moreover, there is evidence that
people tend to process information in the format in which it is
152. According to Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, all public offerings of securities must be registered with the SEC unless they qualify for one
or more exemptions provided in the SEC rules. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15
U.S.C. § 77(d)-(e) (2006).
153. See Rucker & Petty, supra note 95 at 42.
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provided rather than transforming it.154 That means if policy

makers find it desirable for people to choose a product or service based on its comparative attributes against similar products or services, they can facilitate the comparison by explicitly
making the comparative information available to decision
155
makers.
In the context of credit rating agency regulations, policy
makers can facilitate comparison across agencies by ranking
the agencies according to their performance measurements. A
classic illustration of the power of ranking in facilitating people's decision making was shown in a unit price experiment
performed by Edward Russo. 15 6 He believed that the normal
unit price displays for products, with separate tags for each
item, were difficult to process when consumers attempted to
make price comparisons. In a field experiment, he provided
consumers with unit price information in the form of a sorted
list, with brands ranked in the order of increasing unit price.
As a result, consumers saved an average of two percent in
purchase prices. 157 In a more recent study by Sinn, Milberg,
Epstein, and Goodstein, 158 the researchers showed that when
only brand names and prices were provided to consumers who
were asked to choose among alternative products of similar
functions, consumers preferred brands which were more familiar over brands which were less familiar. But when additional information about the relative quality of the alternatives
was presented in the form of a "Consumer Report" type of numerical rating index, the "brand name effect" was diminished
in that consumers preferred the superior albeit less well154. See Paul Slovic, From Shakespeare to Simon: Speculations - and Some Evidence - About Man's Ability To Process Information, 12 OR. RES. INST. BULL. 910B (1972).
155. See Bettman, Payne & Staelin, supra note 80 at 14; see also David C.
Houghton, Frank R. Kardes, Anne Mathieu & Itamar Simonson, Correction
Processesin Consumer Choice, 10 MARKETING LETTERS 107 (1999) (showing that
selection bias can be reduced by an explicit statement of the relative positions of options in a choice set).
156. See Edward Russo, The Value of Unit Price Information, 14J. MARKETING
Rs. 193 (1977).
157. Id.
158. See Francisca Sinn, SandraJ. Milberg, Lenardo D. Epstein & Ronald
C. Goodstein, Compromising the Compromise Effect: Brands Matter, 18 MARKETING LETTERS 223 (2007).
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known brands to the inferior but more familiar brands. 15 9 The
researchers explained this choice preference on the ground
that when product information is available and more diagnostic of the product's quality, consumers' reliance on extrinsic
cues (such as reputation) to make inferences about the quality
of the product is reduced. The researchers concluded, "when
product attributes clearly indicates that one alternative is superior (or inferior) to others in a set of choices and consumers
use that information to form judgment, the1 60effect of brand
familiarity on choice should be diminished."
The effect of ranking choice objects on the decision making process of financial market investors is well illustrated in16a1
mutual fund study by Diane Del Guercio and Paula A. Tkac.
The study examined how Morningstar 1 6 2 ratings affected mutual fund flows. The authors found that Morningstar had substantial independent influence on the investment allocation decisions of retail mutual fund investors. The mere change in the
discrete rating itself (i.e., the number of stars assigned to a
mutual fund), rather than the change in the underlying performance of the funds, could exert significant influence on
fund flow. The authors documented economically and statistically significant inflows following rating upgrades and abnormal outflows following rating downgrades.
Ranking can be an important simplifying heuristic to help
debt issuers and investors comprehend credit rating agencies'
performance disclosures more efficiently so that they are more
likely to select rating agencies based on merits. But who can
perform such a ranking function? There is a Morningstar for
the mutual fund industry, but the financial market lacks a
Morningstar for the credit rating industry. The Franken Proposal1 63 advocates the establishment of a board that dispatches
assignments to rating agencies based on their performances,
159. Id at 232.
160. Supra note 158, at 230.
161. See Diane Del Guercio & Paula A. Tkac, Star Power: The Effect of
Morningstar Ratings on Mutual Fund Flows, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Working Paper No. 15, Aug. 2001), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/
frbatlanta/filelegacydocs/wpOl15.pdf.
162. Morningstar is well known for its analysis and ranking of mutual fund
performances. Information on Morningstar can be found on its Home Page
at http://www.morningstar.com/.
163. Corkery, supra note 9.
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but this proposal builds on the assumption that credit rating
agencies' performance measurements are already calculated
and ranked. There is also a legitimate concern for bureaucracy
associated with a government-sponsored entity allocating ratingjobs based on a pre-determined algorithm. Perhaps a more
plausible approach is to continue relying on market participants to make their own choices based on their idiosyncratic
needs, but to assist them in this process by providing to them
all relevant information in an easily comprehensible and usable form. Thus, the Franken Proposal should be modified in a
way such that the primary function of its board would be not
to allocate rating jobs for the credit rating industry, but to
closely monitor and rank the performances of its players and
make this information freely accessible to the investment community. A Morningstar that truly rates the rating agencies
seems not too bad an idea!
V.
CONCLUSION

Conflicts of interest are believed to have caused the optimistic credit ratings of the risky investments whose collapse
triggered the current economic recession. To combat conflicts
of interest in the credit rating industry, Congress enacted the
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, and under the
guidelines of this statute the SEC has proscribed a series of
rules that delineate the current framework of credit rating
agency regulation.
One important component of the credit rating agency
regulation is the requirement that credit rating agencies disclose statistics that measure the accuracy of their ratings and
their historical rating actions. Performance statistics are compiled in the form of rating transitions and default rates, while
historical rating actions are in the XBRL format, so they can
be downloaded into data processing software to facilitate indepth analyses and industry-wide comparisons by debt issuers
and the public.
The SEC intends to achieve two goals through the performance disclosure requirements: (1) to inflict reputational
damage on credit rating agencies whose ratings are driven by
conflicts of interest, and (2) to promote competition by giving
new entrants to the credit rating industry an opportunity to
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build their track records and compete against brand name
agencies, such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch.
However, the performance disclosures have notable deficiencies, putting them at odds with cognitive science research
on effective communication in two key respects. First, they lack
in standardization, so a person interested in comparing the
performance of different rating agencies must first go through
a laborious process of manually filtering out inconsistencies in
the data. Second, the performance measurements must be extrapolated from raw data entries in the historical rating action
files given that the current disclosures do not provide comparative information. These shortfalls have made the debt issuer's
task of selecting a credit rating agency based on its comparative performance standing much more arduous.
Due to these shortfalls, and in light of cognitive science
and consumer choice research findings on how human beings
react to complex information, there is a legitimate doubt as to
whether the current performance disclosures can achieve the
goals intended by the SEC. The anticipated difficulty in
processing the disclosure materials may be so high as to cause
debt issuers to forego altogether a performance comparison
when selecting a credit rating agency and to simply pick an
agency that has established name recognition in the relevant
rating sector.
This paper empirically tests whether credit rating agencies' historical performance measurements have had any influence on their market share in terms of the number of issuerpaid ratings they have assigned. Although credit rating agencies were not required to disclose their performance statistics
until 2007, data items that are disclosed under the current regulation have long been collected by data vendors and made
available to debt issuers through the subscription to such data
by the issuers' financial advisors. Therefore, by examining the
past relationship between credit rating agencies' market share
with their performance measurements calculated from data
items that are required to be disclosed under the current regulation, one can predict the likely effect of the current disclosure requirements in guiding debt issuers toward selecting a
credit rating agency based on the latter's performance record.
This study is based on a sample of issuer-paid ratings and
rating actions for seven credit rating agencies currently regis-
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tered as NRSROs. The time period spans 2000-2009, and the
rating sectors examined in the study include industrial corporate, financial institutions and insurance company ratings. The
default ratio, "fallen angels" ratio, rating change ratio, and
large rating change ratio are used to measure rating agencies'
performance. The market share of credit rating agencies in
each year of the sample period is examined against the agencies' performance measurements in the previous year and the
previous three years. The study shows that smaller rating agencies outperformed the three biggest agencies (i.e., Moody's,
Standard & Poor's, and Fitch) in most performance measures
during the sample period, and yet the biggest three agencies
still controlled the lion's share of the market in each rating
sector subject to examination. Multivariate regressions show
that the most important factor that has been driving the allocation of market share among credit rating agencies is an
agency's pre-existing market position in a particular rating sector. In sum, debt issuers have been selecting rating agencies
based on the latter's market reputation rather than past performance.
This empirical result is consistent with predictions based
on cognitive science findings, which suggest that information
that is difficult to process tends to be ignored by its viewer and
that simplifying heuristics are needed for consumers to compare products of similar functions. Based on cognitive science
findings, as well as literature on consumer choices and fund
flows of mutual funds, this paper discusses how current disclosures can be improved to communicate more effectively to
debt issuers and to the investing public the accuracy of competing agencies' previous ratings. Specifically, this paper recommends that the SEC follow Europe's lead in establishing a
central credit rating data repository; that it impose standardization requirements in disclosure materials; and that it establish an entity to perform the function that Morningstar is performing for the mutual fund industry, i.e. monitoring and
ranking the performance of competing entities in the industry
and making this information available to the public. Establishing an entity that functions as a rater of the rating agencies is
more plausible than establishing a rating board to dispatch rating assignments under the Franken Proposal 164 (now tempora164. See id.
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rily set aside by Congress pending further investigations). The
former approach assists debt issuers in assessing the quality of
credit rating agencies by providing them with relevant information, allowing them to make the ultimate selection based
on their idiosyncratic needs, while the latter approach imposes
the will of a government-sponsored entity upon them.
The results of this study apply to other industries (such as
auditing) that are just as entrenched with brand-name domination as the credit rating industry. For such industries, disclosures in the form of large volumes of non-standardized and
unprocessed data do not effectively communicate the quality
of competing agencies and cannot overcome the tendency of
their customers to allocate business opportunities based on an
agency's market position.
The importance of the results of this study extends beyond the border of the credit rating industry. The SEC has
taken major initiatives in recent years to replace the traditional
text-based financial reporting and disclosures with electronic
filings using interactive data in the XBRL format. Such an initiative is seen in the disclosures of credit rating agencies, mutual funds, financial institutions and public companies that file
periodic reports under the Exchange Act. The goals of these
enhanced reporting requirements are to allow investors to
search and analyze financial information and compare financial and business performances across companies, reporting
periods, and industries. While electronic filings using data in
the XBRL format are a major improvement over the static textbased filings, the results of this paper suggest that merely providing information in the enhanced format may still be insufficient to achieve the goals intended for this regulatory change.
It is imperative for policy makers to keep in mind the special
characteristics of a regulated industry when they design its disclosure system so that information is not only made available
to the intended users, but is also made comprehensible to
them with a minimum effort. After all, as former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt put it, "disclosure is not disclosure if it
doesn't communicate. 1 6 5

165. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Fulfilling the
Promise of Disclosure (Jul. 23, 1997) (transcript available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1997/spchl7l.txt).
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